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This thesis is devoted to understanding the driving forces of growing wage inequality
across and within countries. My research aims to empirically assess and to find theo-
retical justifications for two features of wage inequality: First, wage inequality among
workers who are similar in education, age, and other characteristics, i.e. ’residual
wage inequality’ and second, the growing wage gap between workers of different skill
groups, i.e. the skill-premium.
Chapter 1. Wage Inequality and the Role of Multinational Firms:
Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data This chapter con-
tributes to our understanding of how firms’ diverse international activities affect wage
inequality between observationally identical workers. Using German linked employer-
employee data, this study investigates the wage premium of exporters and multi-
national enterprises, controlling for observable and unobservable firm and worker
heterogeneity. In doing so, this study is among the first to (1) jointly estimate the
exporter and the multinational wage premium and (2) to further distinguish between
wage premia of multinational firms that are foreign owned (inward FDI) and domes-
tically owned (outward FDI). I find evidence that the wage premium of multinational
firms is larger than the exporter premium. Moreover, my findings suggest that the
so called ’exporter wage premium’, as found by previous studies, is in fact driven
by multinationals that engage in exporting activity. Another important contribu-
tion of the paper is to document the skill and task structure of wage premia and
v
employment. My findings exhibit a clear hierarchy of firms’ international activities
with regard to wage premia for different skill groups and the average observed and
unobserved workforce ability, where MNEs can be ranked highest. This observed
pattern between the ranking of wages and the skills required, suggests worker-firm-
type complementary.
Chapter 2. Heterogeneous Globalisation, Labour Market Rigidities
and Wage Inequality This chapter proposes a theoretical model to study the im-
plications for wage inequality of two distinct forms of globalisation, namely trade and
foreign direct investment. The model exhibits a clear hierarchy of firms’ international
activities with regard to firm size, average workforce ability and wage premia, where
firms engaging in foreign direct investment can be ranked highest. The mechanism is
based on a model with ex-ante homogeneous workers, heterogeneous firms and search
and matching frictions within a two-country two-sector trade model with monopolis-
tic competition. By including foreign direct investment by multinational firms, this
paper provides novel insights into the interaction between firm specific factors and
firms’ international activities in determining wage inequality and in particular, the
multinational wage premium. Furthermore, the comparative statics exercise in this
paper shows that the interdependence between labour market rigidities and firms’
mode of foreign market entry, implies that changes in a country’s labour market
institution changes the distribution of exporters and multinational firms within and
across countries.
Chapter 3. Accounting for Skill Premia across Countries and Time
This chapter uses the structure of a two-sector two-factor model to attribute changes
in the skill premium across countries to three potential sources: (i) changes in the
relative abundance of skilled workers, (ii) technological change and (iii) market size
effects due to external economies of scale. I employ the development and growth
accounting methodology as analytic tool to assess the relative importance of each
vi
one of these channels in explaining changes in the skill premium across countries and
time. My findings add to the growing evidence that there is hardly any association
between changes in the relative supply of skills and the observed evolution of the
skill-premium. Furthermore, I show that the measure of the importance of market
size effects governs the strength of the relationship between technological change
and the skill-premium. Moreover, for strong enough economies of scale, an increase
in the relative supply of skills increases the the skill premium. Importantly, this
finding points out that the scale of the economy may be an important factor in





Debates about the economic role of wages have intensified in recent years. Wages
are the market price of labour and therefore, a key signal in the process of allocating
labour resources to their most productive employment opportunities. Moreover, wage
differentials for workers with varying educational levels create additional incentives
for investment into human capital. Furthermore, in a global context, differences in
the returns to skill across countries are said to be a driving force of immigration
flows and brain drain in particular. In light of the economic significance of wage
differentials between workers within and between different skill groups, this thesis is
devoted to understanding the driving forces of growing wage inequality in the context
of a globalising world.
My first chapter uses German linked employer-employee data to empirically asses
the link between increasing globalisation and wage inequality. The literature, study-
ing the effects of globalisation on wage inequality, has established that exporters pay
more for seemingly identical workers - known as the exporter wage premium. At
the same time, the recent surge in multinational activity, measured by foreign direct
investment (FDI), has broken the link between foreign sales and exports. In fact,
the recent growth of FDI has caught up and at times outpaced the growth of trade
and income. This recent development raises the following questions I address in this
chapter: first, is it exporting per se or multinationals with exporting activity that
contribute to wage inequality between observationally identical workers? Second,
how do firms’ diverse internationalisation decisions affect the employment structure
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within a firm and the skills demanded? I find evidence that multinational firms pay
higher wages than both exporters and firms that are only active in the domestic
market. Moreover, my findings suggest that the so called ’exporter wage premium’,
as found by previous studies, is in fact driven by multinationals that engage in ex-
porting activity. Another important contribution of the paper is to document the
skill and task structure of wage premia and employment. My findings exhibit a clear
hierarchy of firms’ international activities with regard to wages for different skill
groups and the average observed (e.g. educational level and complexity of tasks per-
formed) and unobserved (e.g. productivity of the worker, communication skills etc.)
workforce ability, where multinational firms can be ranked highest. This observed
pattern between the ranking of wages and the skills required, suggests that some
skills and types of knowledge are more valuable to firms that are internationally
active, such as language skills, team work or leadership ability.
The second chapter builds a theoretical model that is able to explain these em-
pirical findings. In doing so I am able to study the implications for wage inequality
of two distinct forms of globalisation, namely trade and foreign direct investment.
In line with my empirical findings, the model exhibits a clear hierarchy of firms’
international activities with regard to firm size, average workforce ability and wages,
where firms engaging in foreign direct investment can be ranked highest. The mech-
anism is based on a model with ex-ante identical workers, heterogeneous firms and
labour market frictions within a two-country two-sector trade model with monopolis-
tic competition. By including foreign direct investment by multinational firms, this
paper provides novel insights into the interaction between firm specific factors and
firms’ international activities in determining wage inequality and in particular, the
multinational wage premium. Furthermore, the comparative statics exercise shows
that the interdependence between labour market rigidities and firms’ mode of foreign
market entry, implies that changes in a country’s labour market institution, changes
the distribution of exporters and multinational firms within and across countries.
In the third chapter of my thesis I turn to a more traditional aspect of wage
x
in quality that has been a central topic in economic analysis and policy debate,
namely the increase in wage inequality between workers of different skill groups.
Applying the basic economic principle of supply and demand in order to understand
changes in the relative wage of skilled workers (skill premium), predicts that an
increase in the relative supply of skills ought to decrease the premium the labour
market pays for skills. A closer look at recent developments of the skill premium
in several countries, however, suggests that for some countries exactly the opposite
is true. Using data for 36 countries from 1983-2008, I show that despite the large
increase in the share of educated people in most countries, the skill premium has
failed to decrease during the same period. This puzzling observation motivates the
analysis of this chapter. I use the structure of a two-sector two-factor model to
attribute changes in the skill premium across countries to three potential sources:
(i) changes in the relative abundance of skilled workers, (ii) technological change and
(iii) market size effects due to external economies of scale. I employ the development
and growth accounting methodology as analytic tool to assess the relative importance
of each one of these channels in explaining changes in the skill premium across
countries and time. My findings add to the growing evidence that there is hardly any
association between changes in the relative supply of skills and the observed evolution
of the skill-premium. Furthermore, I show that the measure of the importance of
market size effects governs the strength of the relationship between technological
change and the skill premium. Moreover, for strong enough economies of scale, an
increase in the relative supply of skills increases the skill premium. Importantly,
this finding points out that the scale of the economy may be an important factor in
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Wage Inequality and the Role of
Multinational Firms: Evidence
from German Linked Employer-
Employee Data
1.1 Introduction
The link between increasing globalisation and wage inequality, has become a central
topic in economic analysis and policy debate. It is by now an established fact that
exporters pay more for seemingly identical workers - known as the exporter wage
premium.1 At the same time, the recent surge in multinational activity, measured
by foreign direct investment (FDI), has broken the link between foreign sales and
exports. In fact, the recent growth of FDI has caught up and at times outpaced
the growth of trade and income.2 This recent development raises the following ques-
tions I address in this paper: first, is it exporting per se or multinationals with
1See for example Bernard et al. (1995),Schank et al. (2007), Verhoogen (2008) and Helpman
et al. (2017) for empirical evidence on the exporter wage premium.
2Shatz and Venables (2000), Navaretti et al. (2004) and Antràs and Yeaple (2014) provide some
stylized facts concerning recent developments regarding exporting and multinational activity.
1
exporting activity that contribute to wage inequality between observationally iden-
tical workers? Second, how do firms’ diverse internationalisation decisions affect the
employment structure within a firm and the skills demanded?
Notes: The figure shows the kernel density of the (log) daily wage distribution in 2006, broken
down by firm-types, i.e. Local firms , exporters and MNEs. MNEs here include, foreign owned
MNEs, domestic MNEs and hybrid MNEs. Statistics refer to all observations in the sample. See
Table 1 & 2 for detailed descriptive statistics on individuals and firms. The kernel is
Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
Figure 1.1: Wage density by firm-type
Figure 1 presents the kernel density of the (log) daily wage in 2006 for Germany
for three different firm types, where I classify internationalising firms according to
two distinct forms of foreign market entry, i.e. exporting vs FDI. This classification
enables me to additionally compare wage premia of exporting firms (without FDI
activity), with wage premia of multinationals (MNEs) that (potentially) also engage
2
in exporting activity. A look at the wage densities of local firms, pure exporters and
MNEs indicates that firms participating in foreign markets via different modes of
market entry pay different wages. This observation suggests that indeed the differ-
entiation between exporters and MNEs is important when studying the implications
of diverse forms of globalistaion for wage inequality.
This study uses German linked employer-employee data to establish some novel
facts about wage and employment differences between firms with diverse interna-
tional activities. In doing so, this paper is among the first to (1) jointly estimate the
exporter and the MNE wage premium and (2) to further distinguish between wage
premia of multinational firms that are foreign owned (inward FDI) and domestically
owned (outward FDI). My findings exhibit a clear hierarchy of firms’ international
activities with regard to wage premia and the average workforce ability, where MNEs
can be ranked highest. This observed pattern between the ranking of wages and the
skills required, suggests worker-firm-type complementary.
The analysis of this paper is based on linked employer-employee data for Germany
(LIAB), which contains detailed information concerning worker and firm character-
istics, firms’ ownership status, as well as exporting and FDI activity. Information
on outward FDI is only available for 2006 and 2010 and hence, limits the analysis
to these two sample periods. The fact that the major share of German FDI flows
is in the form of outward FDI (OECD (2018)), suggests that, when analysing the
MNE wage premium for Germany, it is particularly important to include informa-
tion on German firms’ multinational activity. Germany is an ideal testing ground
for this exercise as it is the largest economy in Europe, one of the largest exporting
countries, a main recipient and sender of FDI in the international market and it has
experienced an increase in (residual) wage inequality in recent decades.3
2This yields the three firm types as shown in the figure: (1) Local firms, i.e. firms with no
international activity, (2) ’pure’ exporters, which are firms that serve foreign markets via exporting,
but do not engage in FDI and (3) MNEs, which are firms with inward/outward FDI and potentially
exporting activity.
3Recent findings from the labour literature (e.g. Autor et al. (2008), Dustmann et al. (2009)
and Card et al. (2013)), emphasise that there has been a rise in wage inequality within narrowly
3
In the baseline regression I focus on the cross-sectional data of 2006 in order to
shed some light on how observed firm and worker heterogeneity can explain part of
the variation in wages. Estimation results of this specification show that pure ex-
porters pay, on average, 1.4% and MNEs 6.5% more for seemingly identical workers.
For the representative worker in my sample (in 2006) this implies that he would
receive about 1,794 euros extra per year if employed for a MNE.4 Because the cross-
sectional analysis ignores the possible sorting of workers with higher unobserved
ability into specific firm types, I further explore to what extent unobserved worker
ability shape my findings. To do so, I make use of the available panel dimension
(2006-2010), by adding individual-, firm- and spell fixed effects. After controlling for
time-invariant unobserved and observed firm and worker heterogeneity, the exporter
premium is about 1.9% and the MNE wage premium 2.5%. The fact that MNE
wage premia reduce by relatively more, after controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity, is suggestive evidence for assortative matching between firm type and workers on
observable unobservable ability. Complementary, the analysis of a sample of firm-
movers, examines and compares the wage growth of workers moving to different firm
types. The results of the switchers analysis confirms that there are advantages as-
sociated with working for internationalising firms. Two distinct findings stand out.
First, workers that move from a local to an exporter or MNE experience, on average,
larger wage gains relative to workers that move within the same firm type. Second,
transitions in the opposite direction, i.e. workers moving away from exporters or
MNEs to local firms, experience a wage growth that is significantly lower than the
defined industries and occupations, suggesting that inequality has been rising not only between
groups, defined by educational categories and\or occupations, but also within groups (”residual
inequality”). Furthermore, recent studies, such as Song et al. (2015) and Card et al. (2018), have
pointed out that this latter type of wage inequality is driven by significant employer-specific wage
differentials.
4The example of the median worker serves a mere illustrative purpose. The median worker in the
sample receives a daily wage of about 105.5 euros per day. Hence, a MNE premium of 6.5% implies
that an observationally identical worker receives about 6.9 euros more per day and aggregated to
a year with about 260 working days this would be about 1,792 euros extra. Given that the average
worker is about 40 years old, all other things equal, he would earn about 44,850 euros more when
entering retirement than his ’identical twin’ in the local firm.
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equivalent wage growth of individuals that move within the same firm type.5
To further investigate the sorting pattern between internationally active firms and
workers on unobserved skills, I back out the worker fixed effect to obtain a measure of
unobserved worker ability. The mean of of this worker effect on the firm level helps to
identify, whether on average exporters and MNEs have workforces of higher average
unobserved skills. A simple OLS regression of the mean unobserved skills per firm
on a set of firm characteristics, confirms that workers with higher unobserved ability
sort into exporters and even more so into MNEs. Furthermore, I explore the sorting
pattern with regard to observed worker skills in terms of educational level and the
complexity of tasks performed. The estimation results suggests that exporters and
MNEs employ, on average, more skilled workers than local firms. To the extent that
unobserved and observed individual characteristics also matter for firm outcomes,
these findings suggest that there is a ’skill-internationality’ complementarity. I test
this hypothesis by further analysing whether exporters and MNEs pay relatively more
for different types of workers. In order to perform this test, I include interaction terms
between the educational or task level with the firm type. The analysis highlights that
MNEs, on average, reward highly educated workers and employees performing highly
complex tasks more than local firms and exporters, which is additional evidence for
worker-firm-type complementarities in the underlying firm technologies.
Related Literature. More generally, this paper is related to a number of recent
studies, which analyse the link between globalisation and wages using firm-level and
linked employer-employee data.6 The paper Helpman et al. (2017) is closely related
to mine for two reasons. First they provide estimates for the exporter wage premium
5These findings are in line with Martins (2011), who uses Portuguese matched employer-employee
data to study the foreign ownership wage premium. Similar to my analysis, his paper, exploits
spells of inter-firm mobility and finds that workers moving from domestic to foreign firms pay
systematically more than movers from foreign to domestic firms. His paper, however, may be
underestimating the effect of MNEs, as his data does not allow him to distinguish between domestic
MNEs and domestic firms with no FDI activity. Moreover, my study investigates the exporter wage
premium, which is not part of his analysis.
6The paper also contributes to research that investigates the effect of openness on the process
of matching between firms and workers, as for example studied by Davidson et al. (2012), Sampson
(2014), Bombardini et al. (2015) and Grossman et al. (2017).
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of about 18%. The reason their wage premium is larger than both my exporter and
MNE wage premium, is probably partly because they use Brazilian manufacturing
data and I use German data for 17 different industries. It goes without saying
that Germany and Brazil are two countries at very different stages of economic
development and hence, comparisons of wage premia between their paper and mine
may be less informative. Also, their paper is silent on whether the exporter premium
is driven by ’pure’ exporters or MNE-exporter, which I distinguish in my analysis.
Furthermore, they only report the exporter wage premium for the cross-section of
1994 and do not exploit to what extent unobserved worker abilities matter.
The second reason their paper is closely related to mine, is because they build a
theoretical model that is able to explain my empirical findings. The mechanism can
be described as follows. Due to complementarieties between the firm productivity
and the average ability of its workers, firms have an incentive to screen workers to
exclude those which fall below the chosen ability-threshold and in so doing, improve
the average ability of their workforce. Hence, the model features imperfect assor-
tative matching on unobservables in the labour market, which is in line with my
findings. Their theory explains positive exporter premia for employment and wages
and predicts imperfect correlations between firm employment, wages and export sta-
tus. In the second chapter of my thesis, I extend Helpman et al. (2017) to also
include FDI activity by multinational firms. By adding multinational activity to the
international trade analysis my second chapter enriches our ability to understand
how labour market reforms can condition the relationship between diverse aspects
of globalisation and labour market outcomes
Apart from papers, which relate to the exporter wage premium (e.g. Bernard
et al. (1995) Schank et al. (2007), Verhoogen (2008), and Baumgarten (2013)), my
analysis in particular related to a growing literature that aims at measuring and
explaining multinational wage premia.7 As most studies can not distinguish between
7Studies based on firm-level data (e.g. Lipsey (2004) or using linked employer-employee data,
such as Heyman et al. (2007), Görg et al. (2007) and Martins (2011) analyse the foreign ownership
wage premium. However, the overall implications of these recent studies are not well understood, as
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domestically owned and foreign owned MNEs, what has been labeled in the literature
as MNE wage premium, usually refers to the foreign ownership wage premium.8Most
closely related to my paper is Tanaka (2015), who estimates the MNE wage premium
for Japan. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only other paper, using employer-
employee data, to jointly estimate the exporter and MNE premium. His study uses
the quantile regression technique to reveal the premium in each quantile of the wage
distribution. This is a dimension I do not explore. Instead, my paper rather focuses
on establishing facts with respect to differences in pay between different firm types
and sorting and matching patterns between internationalising firms and workers of
different skills.
Moreover, this paper sheds light on the skill and task structure of wage premia by
internationalising firms across skill groups and tasks of varying complexity. Previous
studies, such as Munch and Skaksen (2008),Baumgarten (2013) and Klein et al.
(2013), address this aspect of wage inequality in detail for exporting firms. My
analysis is different to these papers in two ways: first, while they focus on the skill
structure with respect to educational groups and/or occupations, my paper adds
the complexity of tasks performed to the analysis. The German linked employer-
employee data set contains information on the task requirement of occupations, which
allows me to account for this detail and thus, contributes importantly to the analysis.
Second, my analysis includes MNEs.9 To the best of my knowledge, the skill and
task structure of MNE wage premia has not been investigated empirically with linked
employer-employee data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I introduce
the data and provide some descriptive stats as motivating evidence. In section 3 I
the results are qualitatively mixed. Some studies seem to confirm the existence of a MNE (foreign
ownership) wage premium and others find insignificant or even a negative effect.
8Theoretical contributions in the literature have suggested different mechanisms for the existence
of the MNE wage premium. See for example Fosfuri et al. (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002), and
Egger and Kreickemeier (2013)Gumpert (2015).
9Following Autor et al. (2013), many empirical and theoretical contributions in the labour
and trade literature, emphasise that distinguishing between educational level and tasks may be
important when measuring the skills demanded by firms.
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analyse the different wage premia based on different specifications. Section 4 offers
empirical evidence for the skill and task structure of wage premia and employment.
Lastly, section 5 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data Description
The analysis is based on matched employer-employee data for Germany, which is
provided in the the linked employer-employee data (LIAB) from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB). I focus on the years 2006 and 2010, which are the years
where information on exporting and multinational activity is available. The core
of this dataset is the IAB establishment panel, which is a representative employer
survey of employment parameters at individual establishments. Using a common
establishment identifier, administrative worker-level information from the German
Federal Employment agency is matched with the survey. See Alda et al. (2005) for
an overview of the LIAB data set.
IAB Establishment Panel
The IAB Establishment Panel is a longitudinal survey, i.e. a large majority of
the same establishments are interviewed every year. As a result, it enables both
analysis of developments across time through comparison of cross-sectional data at
different points in time, and also longitudinal studies of individual establishments.
It contains about 16,000 establishments in Germany that employ at least one worker
who pays social security contributions. As there are about 2.9 million establish-
ments in Germany (in 2014), the IAB Establishment Panel covers roughly 0.55% of
all establishments. The survey was launched in western Germany in 1993, with the
aim of building up a representative information system for continuous analysis of
labour demand. It was extended to eastern Germany in 1996, making it a nation-
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wide survey. Establishments in the IAB Panel are surveyed on various employment
policy-related subjects, including business policy and business development, employ-
ment development, personnel structure, wages and salaries, investment activities and
other general data on the establishment. The survey also includes varying focal top-
ics every year. The IAB Establishment Panel is regarded as containing high data
quality, achieved by means of the high-quality sample, the high exploitation level
and the sophisticated process of data monitoring and error correction. Fischer et al.
(2009) provide an in-depth discussion about the sampling methods.
Individual-Level Data
Data on individuals comes from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)
of the IAB. The IEB cover all workers, subject to social security contributions.
This amounts to about 80 percent of German workers, excluding civil servants, self-
employed, family workers and workers in marginal employment. This data includes
detailed information on several worker characteristics, such as gender, age, nation-
ality, education, tenure and wage compensation. According to the social security
notification regulations, employers ought to report these data at the end of each
year, and at the beginning and end of each employment spell. However, because of
a reporting ceiling in the German social-security system, wages are right-censored
at the contribution limit. The data allows to comprehensively follow individuals
over time, including a large number of individuals who switch from one plant in the
sample to another one also in the sample.
International Activity and Classification of Firms
At the plant-level, the data comprises information about exporting as well as
multinational activity of firms. While information on exporting is available for all
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years, information of FDI activity is only available for the years 2006 and 2010.10
Exporting is measured as the share of sales obtained in export markets. As the
LIAB contains variables that can be used as proxies for outward FDI, I am able
to distinguish between domestic and foreign owned MNEs. In 2006 establishments
were asked whether they had any ’foreign investment in 2004-2005’, where foreign
investment involves extensive ownership stakes in domestic companies and assets of
more than 10%. However, in 2010, establishments are required to report if they
have ’current activity abroad (takeover, foundation or equity participation)’. This
is a more general question, since equity participation may be less than 10% of the
foreign company’s asset. As a result, it may be difficult to identify among the firms
that switch their firm type between 2006 and 2010, and those that actually changed
their mode of foreign market. However, only about 5.6% of all MNEs that are in
the 2006 and 2010 panel, switch their status from MNE to non-MNE firm. The
percentage of firms switching from non-MNE to MNE between the periods is a bit
higher with 27.4%.
Furthermore, I can use the ownership status of the firm to identify foreign owned
MNEs. By definition, a firm under foreign ownership is a multinational enterprise.
With the information on whether a firm exports and/or is classified as a MNE, we
can distinguish between two types of exporting firms. First, ’pure exporters’ are ex-
porters that are non MNEs and second, ’hybrids’ are MNEs that engage in exporting.
The classification of firms is in correspondence to the ownership status (foreign or
domestic) and the internationalisation decision (exporting and/or FDI) of the firm,
which gives rise to 5 different types of firms:
1. Local: firms that are domestically owned and do not participate in international
markets.
2. Exporters: these are the ’pure’ exporting firms, i.e. firms that are domestically
10Information about the export destination and FDI recipient countries is limited and, thus,
cannot be used for the purpose of this study.
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owned and serve foreign markets via exporting, but do not report outward FDI.
3. Domestically owned MNEs: firms under domestic ownership that report posi-
tive outward FDI, but do not export.
4. Foreign owned MNEs: are establishments under foreign ownership, without
positive exports.
5. Hybrid: firms that report positive exports and are MNEs, i.e. either fall into
category (3) or (4)
Sample Restriction
The sample includes all firms within the private sector, for which we have infor-
mation on ownership, industry and size of the workforce (at least 5 employees). On
the worker side, I take all individuals into account that are within the working age
population, i.e. between 16 and 65 years. Furthermore, I restrict the sample to all
fulltime workers where information is available in both sample years.
1.2.2 Descriptive and Non-parametric Statistics
Firm Level Statistics
Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of firms and workers by firm-type for the
year 2006. Among 4,779 firms in the sample, 3,086 (65%) are local, 1,090 (21%) are
exporters and a total of 603 (13%) are MNEs. Within the category of MNEs only
48 (1.00%) are domestically owned MNEs, 150 (3%) are foreign owned MNEs and
405 (9%) are hybrid MNEs, i.e. firms that export and engage in FDI activity.
With respect to the number of workers by firm-type, we ascertain that the ma-
jority (39%) works for exporters , 32% for local firms and about 30% is employed
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by MNEs, where 2% work for domestic MNEs, 4% in foreign owned MNEs and 24%
in hybrid MNEs. The total number of employees in the 2006 sample is 332,654.
Notice that although the percentage share of MNEs accounts for only 13% , these
firms employ an over-proportional fraction of the total workforce in the sample. This
observation suggests that MNEs tend to be on average larger firms.
Table 1.1: Number of firms and workers by firm-type (2006)
Firm type No. of firms % No. of workers %
Local 3,086 64.57 105,776 31.80
Exporter 1,090 20.88 128,372 38.59
MNE 603 12.61 98,506 29.61
Domestic 48 1.00 5,133 1.54
Foreign 150 3.14 12,210 3.67
Hybrid 405 8.47 271,386 24.40
Total 4,779 100.00 332,654 100.00
Notes: Analysis based on LIAB data for the year 2006.The sample corresponds to full-time workers
between 16 and 65 years of age, where data is available for a set of worker and firm characteristics
in both sample periods.
Worker-Level Statistics
Worker-level descriptive statistics of daily wages according to the different firm-
types are presented in Table 2. The table indicates that local firms pay the lowest
wages, followed by ascending order of exporters, foreign owned MNEs, domestic
MNEs and hybrid MNEs. Furthermore, Table 2 summarises some additional worker
statistics for the three different firm types, including tenure at the firm (in years),
age, and information on the dummies for gender (1 equals woman) and nationality
(1 equals foreign).
Figure 1 above shows the kernel density of the (log) daily wage in the 2006 wage
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Table 1.2: Firm - Worker Statistics
Min Mean Max Sd N
Local
daily wage 1.03 96.33 212.97 38.77 105776
tenure 0 10.13 31.50 7.41 105776
age 16 41.16 61 9.96 105776
woman 0 0.28 1 0.45 105776
foreign 0 0.04 1 0.20 105776
firm size 5 897.64 13702 11055.461 105776
Exporter
daily wage 1 105.56 237.77 36.73 128372
tenure 0 12.22 31.5 7.89 128372
age 16 40.66 61 9.87 128372
woman 0 0.16 1 0.34 128372
foreign 0 0.06 1 0.24 128372
firm size 5 9958.35 44494 16949.73 128372
MNE
daily wage 1.13 115.10 212.05 38.14 98497
tenure 0 11.51 31.52 7.88 98497
age 16 40.63 61 9.59 98497
woman 0 0.17 1 0.34 98497
foreign 0 0.07 1 0.25 98497
firm size 5 2501.34 15096 3700.11 98497
Total
daily wage 1 105.45 237.77 38.51 332645
tenure 0 11.35 31.50 7.94 332645
age 16 40.81 61 9.82 332645
woman 0 0.20 1 0.40 332645
foreign 0 0.06 1 0.23 332645
firm size 5 4869.153 44494 11488.38 332645
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sample for the three main categories of firm-types: Local firms, exporters and MNEs.
The figure supports the descriptive evidence from Table 2 that MNEs, on average,
pay higher wages than exporters and locals, respectively. Jointly Table 2 and Figure
1, indicate that the differentiation between exporter and MNEs is important when
studying the implications of globalistaion for wage inequality in Germany.
1.3 The Exporter and MNE Wage Premium
1.3.1 Empirical Methodology - Wage Premia
This section outlines the empirical strategy to analyse the existence and magnitude
of the MNE and exporter wage premium. In the baseline regression I focus on the
cross-sectional data of 2006 in order to shed some light on how observed firm and
worker heterogeneity can explain part of the variation in wages. The subsequent
subsection then accounts for unobserved firm and worker characteristics by adding
fixed effects to the baseline regression. For this purpose, I explore the panel dimen-
sion of the data (2006-2010). This enables us to disentangle the different sources
of the wage premia and may highlight potential sorting patterns on unobservables.
Complementary, the analysis of a sample of firm-movers, examines and compares the
wage growth of workers moving to different firm types.
Baseline Regression Set-Up
Using German linked employer-employee data for the year 2006, I test whether firms
that participate in international markets via different modes of market entry (i.e.
exporting, FDI or both), pay different wages relative to firms that are only active in
the domestic market. I employ an OLS estimation using the following Mincer wage
regression
logwij = ds + do + FTY PE ′jβ1 + FSIZE ′jβ2 +X ′iβ3 + vij, (1.1)
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where the index j identifies the firm at which worker i is employed. The dependent
variable is the log daily wage logwij of individual i; ds and do denote sector and
occupation fixed effects; the categorical variable FTY PEj indicates the firm type,
i.e. Local, Exporter, MNEFor, MNEDom and Hybrid. FSIZEj controls for the
size of the firm, measured by the log size of the firm’s workforce, Xi is a vector of
observable worker characteristics and vij is a residual. The coefficients of interest are
contained in the vector β1, which captures the wage premia the different firm types
pay, i.e. an exporter wage premium and premia for working for any of the three types
of MNEs (domestic MNEs, foreign owned MNEs and hybrid MNEs). Moreover, β2
represents the employment size wage premium.
The five different firm types follow the classification as outlined in section 2.1.
Furthermore, I control for worker observables nonparametrically, including, gender,
age, nationality (foreign or not), education (low, medium, high), occupation and
tenure at the firm.
Extended Specification
The cross-sectional analysis ignores the possible sorting of workers with higher un-
observed ability into specific firm types. In order to account for time invariant
unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity, I estimate a regression of log daily wages
on worker and firm observables, including worker, firm or a unique worker–firm com-
bination (spell) fixed effects. In the labour literature this method is known as the
AKM decomposition (Abowd et al. (1999)). For this estimation, I use the available
data for 2006 and 2010. I next extend the baseline regression in (1) to exploit the
panel dimension of the data. The adjusted OLS mincer wage estimation is then given
10The survey questions in 2006 and 2010 on foreign investment determine the number of domestic
MNEs in each year; given that the fraction of domestic MNEs is rather small (0.81%) and assuming
that a firm type is stable over the short sample period, I have a sample ranging from 2006-2010.
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by
logwijt = ds + do + FTY PE ′jtβ1 + FSIZE ′jtβ2 +X ′itβ3 + µ+ αi + ψj + vijt (1.2)
again firms are indexed by j and workers by i and logwijt is the log daily wage
worker i employed by firm j at time t. This estimation now includes a year fixed ef-
fect µ, an individual fixed effect αi and an establishment fixed effect ψj. Introducing
worker fixed effects allows me to address the issue of workers sorting on unobserved
ability into specific firm types. A firm fixed effect controls for time-invariant firm
characteristics. The fixed effects method implies that identification of the firm type
coefficient (β1) is driven only by those workers who move to firms of a different type
between the two sample periods, or by firms which switch type. Moreover, for this
specification I aggregate the three different MNE firm types together as I am going
to focus on the difference in pay between local firms, exporters and MNEs as a whole.
Firm-Type Switchers
Another way to test whether there is a positive association between wages and firms’
international activity is to analyse a panel of workers moving to different firm types.
If it is the exporter/MNE status that matters then we should expect to see that (con-
ditioning for firm size and other firm characteristics) the wage growth for workers
who move from local to exporters/MNEs to be different to the wage growth for those
who move in the opposite direction or remain within the same firm type. Figure 2
presents the relative frequency of different types of movers that will be the basis of
this analysis: Firstly, workers that move to another firm but remain in the same firm
type, including local to local (LL), exporter to exporter (EE) and MNE to MNE
(MM) switchers. I denote these movers as Same-switchers. Second, individuals
that switch to and from local firms: Local to exporter (LE), local to MNE (LM),
exporter to local (EL) and MNE to local (ML). Third, workers switching between
exporter and MNEs, namely exporter to MNE (EM) and MNE to exporter (ME)
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switchers.
Notes: The figure shows the relative frequency of firm type switchers. Switchers are defined as
workers, who move between 2006 and 2010 to a new establishment, where (0) Same is the
reference group and refers to individuals moving within the same firm type, i.e. local to local,
exporter to exporter or MNE to MNE; (1) are local to exporter movers, (2) local to MNE, (3)
exporter to MNE (4) MNE to exporter, (5) exporter to local and (6) MNE to local. Statistics
refer to the sample of movers, where data is available in both periods, based on LIAB data. The
sample corresponds to full-time workers between 16 and 65 years of age.
Figure 1.2: Relative Frequency of Firm-type Switchers
The question I address is as follows: how much do wages change when a worker
moves to a different firm type? To facilitate the dynamic benefits and losses of mov-
ing to different firm types, I subsequently estimate the following specification with
firm switchers (SWITCH ), where I now consider wage growth (∆wij= logwij,2010 −
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logwij,2006) as the dependent variable:
∆wij = ψj + ds + do + FTY PE ′jβ1 + FSIZE ′jβ2
+ ∆FSIZE ′jβ3 + SWITCH ′jβ4 +X ′itβ5 + vij (1.3)
where again the index j identifies the firm at which worker i is employed. As in
the previous specifications, ds and do denote sector and occupation fixed effects; the
categorical variable FTY PEj indicates the firm type, i.e local, exporter or MNE.
Additional to the the size of the firm (FSIZEj), I control for the change in firm size
(∆FSIZEj) between 2006-2010. Xi is the vector of time-varying observable worker
characteristics, including age, education tenure and occupation and vij is a residual.
The firm fixed effect ψj accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity. The main coef-
ficient of interest is now the vector β4, which captures the difference in pay between
the different firm-type switchers. The reference group are the Same-switchers, i.e.
workers that move firm but remain within the same firm type. Unlike in the panel
estimation, this specification relies on a sample of firm movers only, which enables
me to control for the possibility that there is a difference between workers who switch
and workers who stay within the same firm type.
1.3.2 Estimation Results - Wage Premia
Baseline Results
Table 3 summarises the estimation results based on five different types of wage
regressions, which differ with respect to the controls included at the right hand side.
The first regression in column 1, captures the ’raw’ difference in pay between the
different firm types, excluding any further controls for firm or worker characteristics.
The wage premia can consequently be interpreted as follows: Firms that serve foreign
markets by exporting only, pay on average, 11.7% higher wages than local firms.
Foreign MNEs, domestic MNEs and hybrids, on average, pay a premium of 18.3%,
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17.2% and 21.9%, respectively. Not surprisingly, this reduced form regression has a
very low adjusted R2 of 0.035.
Table 1.3: Unravelling the different Wage Premia (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls +Size +Industry +Occ +obs
Exporter 0.117*** -0.00797*** 0.00954*** 0.0208*** 0.0138***
(0.00181) (0.00178) (0.00216) (0.00189) (0.00165)
MNEFor 0.185*** 0.116*** 0.0914*** 0.0987*** 0.0826***
(0.00417) (0.00390) (0.00396) (0.00341) (0.00299)
MNEDom 0.173*** 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.0239*** 0.0384***
(0.00623) (0.00583) (0.00584) (0.00499) (0.00436)
MNEHyb 0.215*** 0.106*** 0.117*** 0.0721*** 0.0744***
(0.00203) (0.00196) (0.00235) (0.00205) (0.00180)
log size 0.0881*** 0.0802*** 0.0741*** 0.0667***
(0.00034) (0.00042) (0.00038) (0.00045)
Observations 332,645 332,645 332,645 332,645 332,645
Firms 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779
R2 0.035 0.158 0.188 0.430 0.565
Notes: Regressions based on LIAB data for the year 2006. The sample corresponds to full-
time workers between 16 and 65 years of age, where data is available in both sample periods.
Dependent variable is the log daily wage. Firm variables include the firm type (local, exporter
and 3 different MNEs), the log of employment (size) and 17 industry categories. Worker
observables include: gender, age, nationality (dummy for foreign), tenure at the firm, 340
different occupations and the educational level. The education groups are defined as: 1) low:
no vocational training, no high-school; 2) medium: high school and/or vocational training;
3) high: university or technical college. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
significance at: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The second specification (see column 2) adds the log of the total number of em-
ployees to the regression. Consistent with a large empirical literature in labour eco-
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nomics, larger firms on average pay higher wages (see e.g. Brown and Medoff (1989)
and Oi and Idson (1999) for surveys). The coefficient for the log of employment is
given by 0.088, implying that an increase in employment by one percent, increases
the wage rate by about 0.088 percent. As MNEs and exporting firms tend to be
larger than local firms, the coefficients for the different firm types decrease. Note,
however, that after controlling for the size of the firm, the coefficient for exporters
is negative, implying a negative exporter premium of -0.8%. As documented by
Felbermayr et al. (2014) the exporter wage premium in Germany is non-monotonic,
with firms with medium-sized export shares paying the largest premium. Note as
well that I classify exporters in a more narrow way than previous studies, who would
include hybrid-MNEs, i.e. firms that engage in FDI and exporting activity into their
’exporter’ category. This, together with the fact that I do not control for firms’
export shares, might explain the negative, yet very small coefficient after controlling
for the size of the firm. The coefficients for the different MNEs become more similar
to one another, but remain with on average 11% still relatively large. Similarly,
the small increase of the adjusted R2 to 0.158, suggests that some of the observed
differences in pay of exporters and MNEs, relative to local firms (see column 1), can
be explained by the size of the firms.
The results in column 3 and 4 are based on a regression that further includes
industry and occupation fixed effects, respectively. The exporter premium now
becomes positive again, implying that industry and occupation characteristics are
strongly enough correlated with the export status to reestablish a positive premium
of about 2.8%. The decrease in the coefficients for the different MNEs under these
specifications suggests that the difference in pay between the different firm types, as
captured in column 1, are mainly due to specific industry and occupation character-
istics. This result implies that MNEs belong to high-wage industries and/or have a
larger share of high-paying occupations. The strong increase of the adjusted-R2 to
now 0.430 in column 4 confirms this finding. Thus, after controlling for firm-size,
industry and occupation fixed effects, the exporter wage premium is still about 2.8%
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and that of MNEs on average about 7.5%.
The last specification, presented in column 5, adds the vector Xi of worker charac-
teristics, including gender, age, nationality (dummy for whether worker is foreign),
education and tenure at the firm, to the regression. As expected, adding worker
observables further raises the adjusted-R2, now taking a value of 0.565. However,
the coefficients for the different firm types change very little relative to the previous
specification with industry and occupation fixed effects. More precisely, the exporter
wage premium reduces to 1.4% and for foreign owned MNEs, domestic MNEs and
hybrids to 8.2%, 3.7% and 7.3%, respectively. The coefficients of the different firm-
types are statistically significant at the 1% in all four specifications. Furthermore,
the MNE and exporter premium are significantly different from one another.
In summary, estimations based on this cross-sectional analysis show that even
after controlling for firm-size, industry, occupation and worker characteristics, firms
with international activities, on average, pay higher wages than local firms. Further-
more, the wage premium payed by MNEs is larger than the exporter wage premium.
Among MNEs, firms that export and engage in FDI, pay the highest wage premia,
followed by MNEs that are foreign owned.
Results from Panel Regressions
Table 4 summarises the estimation results of equation (2). The first three specifica-
tions capture three different conventional models, as each controls for heterogeneity
from only one side of the market, at best. The fourth specification includes both
sets of time-invariant heterogeneity through a spell fixed effect. The idea here is to
assess the extent to which estimates on the firm-type are affected by worker- and
firm-level covariates. This allows me to assess to what extent time-invariant unob-
served worker and firm characteristics are correlated with the firm-type. Firm type
coefficients remain significant at the 1% level for all specifications and coefficients
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for exporters and MNE status are significantly different from each other.11
Table 1.4: Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter 0.0299*** 0.0206*** 0.026*** 0.0191***
(0.000877) (0.000958) (0.00165) (0.000932)
MNE 0.0492*** 0.0269*** 0.0161*** 0.0250***
(0.000932) (0.00104) (0.00181) (0.00102)
log size 0.0692*** 0.0332*** 0.0463*** 0.0259***




Time FE x x x x
Worker controls x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Observations 665290 665290 665290 665290
Firms 5,490 5,490 5,490 5,490
R2 0.430 0.574 0.456 0.579
Notes: Regressions based on LIAB data for the year 2006 and 2010. The
sample corresponds to full-time workers between 16 and 65 years of age, where
data is available in both sample periods. Dependent variable is the log daily
wage. See notes of table 3 for the set of firm and worker observables. Standard
errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at: * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The first column captures the results of a simple pooled ordinary least squares
(POLS) estimation including year fixed effects. This estimation confirms the findings
11In the Appendix A provide results for the panel regression with the more detailed classification
of MNEs.
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presented in Table 3 that MNEs pay higher wage premia than exporters. Note,
however, that relative to the numbers from the cross-sectional analysis, the premium
for exporters has now increased slightly, taking a value of 2.9% and the equivalent
coefficient for MNEs has decreased from about 8% to 4.9%.
The second column shows the results for the individual fixed effect regression,
which takes care of unobserved worker heterogeneity, such as ability, productivity,
social competence, networks and so forth. The increase in the R2 from 0.487 to 0.574,
indicates that unobserved characteristics of workers, captured by individual fixed
effects, contribute to the variance of log wages. This is also reflected in lower wage
premia for exporters and MNEs, where the coefficient for MNEs reduces by relatively
more, suggesting a potentially stronger correlation between worker unobservables and
MNE status.
The third column includes firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant un-
observed firm heterogeneity. The results of this regression, however, have to be
interpreted with caution. One potential limitation is that there may be only little
variation in the firm-type variable during this relatively short period of 4 years (2006-
2010). Furthermore, variation in firm-types, may not be caused by actual changes in
the way firms participate in international activity, but may be due to to the fact that
the survey questions concerning outward FDI vary slightly in the two given years.12
This caveat may affect the estimated coefficient for exporter and MNE wage premia.
Keeping this caveat in mind, the table reports that after controlling for unobserved
characteristics of employers, captured by employer fixed effects, the exporter wage
premium (2.6%) is now larger than the premium payed by MNEs (1.6%). The low
value of the R2, relative to the other specifications, suggest that firm fixed effects on
their own contribute little to the variance of log wages.
12In 2006 establishments were asked whether they had any ’foreign investment in 2004-2005’. In
2010 the question is formulated in a more general sense, whether they have ’current activity abroad
(takeover, foundation or equity participation)’. Foreign investment involves extensive ownership
stakes in domestic companies and assets of more than 10%. Whereas, the question in 2010 refers
to equity participation in general, which may be less than 10% of the foreign company’s asset.
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Combining worker fixed effects and firm fixed effects (see column 4) through a
spell fixed effect, accounts for unobserved match-specific heterogeneity. A potential
source of match heterogeneity in wages is complementarity between the skills of the
worker and the needs of the firm. To the extent that the individual worker has
significant bargaining power, this complementarity will be rewarded in the form of
higher wages. Concerning the validity of the coefficients, however, the same caveats
hold as were the case for the firm fixed effects specification: within-group variation
may be a noisy measure of true firm-type changes. Under this last specification,
MNEs on average, pay the highest wages with a premium of 2.5% and the exporter
premium is 1.9%. Under this last specification the R2 takes the highest value of
0.580.
In summary, after including worker fixed effects the exporter and MNE wage pre-
mia reduce significantly, implying that unobserved worker characteristics are posi-
tively correlated with firms’ international activities. Additionally, taking results from
the spell fixed effects regression into account, gives suggestive evidence for comple-
mentarities between (unobserved) worker skills and firm technologies.
Results: Firm-Type Switchers
Table 5 presents the estimation results of the switchers regression. The first column
shows the results for the OLS regression and the second column presents the results
after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. The estimated switcher dummies
seem to confirm the hypothesis stated above, i.e. workers moving from a local firm
to a firm that participates in international activities, experience, on average, a larger
wage gain than workers moving within the same firm type. Focusing on the firm
fixed effects specification in column 2 shows that workers that switch from a local
firm to an exporter (LE) receive a mobility premium of about 17.6% and local to
MNE movers (LM) 30.1% respectively.
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1 L-EX 0.0969** 0.176**
(0.0373) (0.0604)
2 L-MNE 0.295*** 0.308***
(0.0260) (0.0316)
3 EX-MNE 0.113*** 0.0587
(0.0241) (0.0306)
4 MNE-EX 0.000276 -0.0489
(0.0393) (0.0619)
5 EX-L -0.206*** -0.313***
(0.0323) (0.0473)
6 MNE-L -0.148*** -0.368***
(0.0324) (0.0487)




Notes: Dependent variable is the change in
the log daily wage. Controls include firm-
type, 7 switcher types (see Figure 2), log
of employment size in levels and changes,
industry, age tenure and education. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Asterisks in-
dicate significance at: * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.25
Contrary, movers in the opposite direction experience, on average, wage changes
that are lower than that of Same-switchers.13 For workers moving from an exporter
to a local firm (EL) the average wage change is about 31,3% lower and that of
ML switchers about 36.8% respectively. Note, that the disadvantages from moving
away from exporters or MNEs are larger than the advantages from a transition to
one of these firm-types. One explanation for this finding could be that separations
and the direction of the transition is endogenous and may capture some underlying
sorting patterns. Additional worker and match-specific fixed effect would be a way
to control for this. However, it is not possible to include worker fixed effects into the
specification, where the dependent variable is the change in the log of the wage, as
the panel includes only two time periods.
All coefficients, apart from the one for the LE switchers, are significant at the 1%
level. The LE coefficient is significant at the 5% significance level. The coefficients
for movers that switch among Exporters and MNEs are relatively small compared to
the ones described for the other switchers; the coefficients for ME and EM switchers
are not significant.
It should be noted that the estimated coefficients capture static and dynamic
advantages of switching to a particular firm type, i.e. there may be first a jump
in the wage the moment the worker switches firm type and additionally, dynamic
advantages associated with working within a particular firm type, such as learning
by working for a MNE. Given the relatively short sample period (2006-2010), the
coefficients can only be interpreted as capturing the static and dynamic advantages
within this time frame, and do not take wage changes beyond this period into account.
This would be of particular interest to test whether e.g. wage growth exhibits a u-
shaped pattern after moving firm type.
Summing up, the results of the switchers analysis highlights two distinct findings:
13Table A.3 in the Appendix presents estimation results based on a regression as in equation (2),
additionally controlling for whether a worker moved during the sample period. Based on a simple
POLS estimation firm-movers earn on average 3.8% less and the firm fixed specification suggests
that movers are being payed about 7% less relative to stayers.
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First, workers that move from a local to an exporter or MNE experience, on average,
larger wage gains relative to workers that move within the same firm type. Second,
transitions in the opposite direction, i.e. workers moving away from exporters or
MNEs to local firms, experience a wage growth that is significantly lower than the
equivalent wage growth of individuals that move within the same firm type.
1.3.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I consider the robustness of my results to different subsamples of the
data set and by further analysing differences in the wage premia among MNEs.
In the Appendix, Table A.1. presents estimation results equivalent to the ones
in Table 3, where I include workers that may only appear in the sample in 2006.
Consequently, the sample corresponds to full-time workers between 16 and 65 years
of age, where data is available at least in 2006. The qualitative interpretation of
the different firm type coefficients only changes with respect to the second column,
which adds the firm size to the regression: The exporter premium is now positive at
the 1% significance level.
Additionally, I present estimation results for the different wage premia equivalent
to Table 4, using a sample excluding all firms that switch their type between 2006
and 2010. This addresses the concern regarding the varying survey questions on
outward FDI in the two sample periods.14. Table A.2 in the Appendix summarises
the results.
Table A.3 presents estimation results based on a regression as in equation (2),
additionally controlling for whether a worker moved during the sample period. As
shown in the table, based on a simple POLS estimation firm-movers earn on aver-
age 9.2% less and the firm fixed specification suggests that movers are being payed
about 9% less relative to stayers. One potential explanation for this finding could
be that movers had some unemployment spell between moving from one firm to
14See discussion related to estimation results of Table 4
27
another. Another reason that might explain why movers earn less on average may
be that these workers accept a lower starting wage at another firm in exchange of
a steeper wage profile during their time at the new firm. Alternatively, incentives
may be going the other way: because movers are dissatisfied with their low wages
they move to a different firm, with the expectation of receiving more at another firm.
1.4 The Skill and Task Structure of Wage Premia
and Employment
The above analysis gives suggestive evidence for the presence of complemantarities
between (unobserved) worker ability and firm types: First, results from the fixed
effects estimation in section 3.2 pointed out that unobserved worker and firm het-
erogeneity are important factors in explaining some of the variation in wages among
observationally identical individuals. Moreover, I show that wage premia reduce after
controlling for worker and spell fixed effects and that MNE wage premia reduce rel-
atively more. These results are indicative for positive assortative matching between
worker and firm type. In this section I will further investigate the sorting patterns




In order to test whether and to what extent workers with higher unobserved ability
sort into internationalising firms, I will employ the following empirical approach:
First, the estimated individual fixed (see equation (2)), can be used as a measure
of the unobserved ability of the worker. This may include a worker’s productivity,
language skills and other characteristics that are not available to the econometrician.
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Second, using the mean of these unobserved abilities on the firm-level, I will then
employ the following OLS firm-level regression for the 2006 cross-section:
φj = ds + FTY PE ′jβ1 + FSIZE ′jβ2 +X ′mβ3 + vj (1.4)
where φj is the mean of the unobserved worker ability in firm j and the firm controls
are as before, an industry fixed effect (ds), firm size (FSIZE) and the firm type
(FTY PE). The vector Xm aggregates several worker characteristics up to the firm
level, i.e. the share of foreign and female workers and the average age and tenure of
workers in the firm.
The estimation results confirm our inference from the previous section, namely
that workers with higher unobserved ability sort into exporters and even more into
MNEs. There are several potential explanations for the observed sorting pattern
between firm types and unobserved worker skills. Intuitively, some skills and types
of knowledge are going to be more valuable to firms that are internationally active,
such as language skills, working in larger and more heterogeneous teams, leadership
ability etc. To the extent that unobserved individual characteristics also matter
for firm outcomes, the results from Table 6 suggest there is a ’skill-internationality’
complementarity.
In a similar fashion to Table 3, Table 6 summarises the estimation results based
on different types of wage regressions, which differ with respect to the controls in-
cluded at the right hand side. The estimated coefficients in column 4, based on a
specification including all firm controls, suggest that exporters and MNEs employ,
14Previous research from the labour literature has already provided evidence for the importance of
assortative matching, as measured by the correlation between individual and establishment effects,
for sorting patterns wage inequality (see for example Shimer and Smith (2000), Rogerson et al.
(2005) and Chade et al. (2017) for reviews of the search and matching literature). Here, I am
interested in the correlation between the individual fixed effect and a specific firm characteristic,
namely the firm type.
14For example, we would think that communication and language skills are more valuable to firms,
who are internationally active by developing relationships with customers and business partners
abroad.
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Table 1.6: Sorting Patterns - Unobserved Ability and Firm Types (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Controls +Size +Industry +Obs
Exporter 0.0768*** -0.0056 0.0860*** 0.0702***
(0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0156)
MNE 0.256*** 0.0873*** 0.170*** 0.129***
(0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0199)
log size 0.0932*** 0.0798*** 0.0551***
(0.00434) (0.00436) (0.00410)
Firms 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779
R2 0.033 0.188 0.194 0.340
Notes: Table presents regression results based on a firm-level sample,
with the average unobserved skill per firm as dependent variable. I
construct the measure of unobserved worker ability by backing out the
individual fixed effects of a regression of log individual wages as in
specification (2). I then take the average of the obtained worker fixed
effect on the firm level. Firm controls include industry, firm size, and
the firm type. Worker characteristics are averaged on the firm level, i.e.
the share of foreign, female and high skilled workers and the average
age and tenure of workers in the firm Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance at: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
on average, workers with higher unobserved characteristics than local firms. The co-
efficient for exporters takes a value of 0.0138 and for MNEs 0.0826, respectively. The
estimated coefficients in all specifications are significant at the 1% and the exporter
and MNE coefficient are significantly different from each other in all estimations.
Furthermore, the positive coefficient for firm size (0.0667) indicates that larger firms
have, on average better workers with respect to their unobserved component of skills.
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Observed Skills
In addition to providing evidence for positive assortative matching between firm type
and unobserved worker ability, I will further explore the sorting pattern with regard
to observed worker skills in terms of educational level and the complexity of tasks
performed. Following Autor et al. (2008), many empirical and theoretical contri-
butions in the labour and trade literature, emphasise that distinguishing between
educational level and tasks may be important when measuring the skills demanded
by firms. A higher demand for skills, in turn, may capture underlying features of
the production process, such as complementarities between firm productivity and
worker ability
The three educational groups are defined as follows: the first category captures
workers with a ’low’ educational level, who at most have a high-school diploma and
no vocational training. The second group refers to workers with a medium level
of education, i.e. with a high-school diploma at most and vocational training or
“Abitur” qualification for university entrance without vocational training or “Abitur”
qualification for university entrance with vocational training. Respectively, the group
with a high level of education has a university diploma or a technical college diploma.
Furthermore, I investigate differences in the task structure between different firm
types. Here, the formal qualification of the person practicing the occupation is
irrelevant; the subject of consideration is rather the requirement level that is typically
demanded for this occupational activity. The objective of classifying occupations
according to their complexity is to be able to depict the various degrees of complexity
within those occupations which have a high similarity of occupational expertise. This
need not be based on the educational level, but can also be acquired through work
experience and learning-by-doing. I distinguish between three levels to map the
degree of complexity of an occupation: (1) unskilled/semiskilled task, (2) skilled
task, (3) complex task.15
15See Appendix for a description of the classification of occupations according to their task
complexities.
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Methodologically, I will estimate a regression similar to the one in equation (4).
The dependent variables for the two specifications of interest, are the share of high-
skilled workers and the share of workers performing complex tasks. Table 7 and 8
summarise the estimation results equivalent to the one for unobserved worker skills
in Table 6.
Table 1.7: Share of High Skilled Workers (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Controls +Size +Industry +Obs
Exporter 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.00331) (0.00338) (0.00355) (0.00353)
MNE 0.0589*** 0.0438*** 0.0552*** 0.0568***
(0.00418) (0.00447) (0.00445) (0.00443)
log size 0.0083*** 0.0061*** 0.0072***
(0.0009) (0.00090) (0.00092)
Observations 4779 4779 4779 4779
R2 0.042 0.058 0.176 0.192
Notes: Table presents regression results based on a firm-level sample, with
the share of high skilled workers in a firm as dependent variable. Firm con-
trols include industry, firm size, and the firm type. Worker characteristics
are averaged on the firm level, i.e. the share of foreign and female workers
and the average age and tenure of workers in the firm. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
The estimated coefficients in column 4 of Table 7, based on a specification in-
cluding all firm controls, suggest that exporters and MNEs employ, on average, more
skilled workers than local firms. The coefficient for exporters takes a value of 0.0259
and for MNEs 0.0568, respectively. The estimated coefficients in all specifications are
significant at the 1% and the exporter and MNE coefficient are significantly different
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from each other in all estimations.
This observed sorting pattern, i.e. the fact that more skilled workers match with
firms that participate in global markets, provides further supportive evidence for the
hypothesis regarding worker-firm-type complementarities. Furthermore, this finding
is in line with theoretical and empirical predictions from the search and matching lit-
erature, where sorting arises due to complemenatirties in the production technology
of the firm (e.g. Bagger and Lentz (2014) Eeckhout and Kircher (2018) and Lopes de
Melo (2018)). As has been pointed out by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), wages can
give information about the strength of sorting, which is consistent with the result
that MNEs pay higher premia for high skilled workers.16 The same analysis can
be carried out for the share of workers performing complex tasks. The estimation
results in Table 8 are in line with the discussion concerning the share of high skilled
workers: exporters employ, on average, more workers performing complex tasks than
local firms, as captured by the significant and positive coefficient of 0.0263. The
respective coefficient for MNEs takes a value of 0.0784, implying that MNEs, on
average, have the highest share of occupations that are of complex task content.
1.4.2 Wage Premia across Skill Groups and Task Levels
The above analysis suggests that there is a skill-internationality complementarity.
In the presence of complementarities we would expect that MNEs and exporters pay
more for workers with higher skills. Furthermore, I explore whether different firm
types reward workers, performing tasks of varying complexity differently.
Differences in pay by educational group
In order to analyse whether exporters and MNEs pay relatively more for different
types of workers, I will next run a regression as in (1) with an additional interaction
16However, Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) argue, from wage data alone, one cannot distinguish
a model that features positive sorting from a model of negative sorting, due to non-monotonic
relationship between wages and firm type.
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Table 1.8: Share of Workers performing Complex Tasks (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Controls +Size +Industry +Obs
Exporter 0.0122* 0.000146 0.0267*** 0.0263***
(0.00487) (0.00497) (0.00501) (0.00496)
MNE 0.0733*** 0.0486*** 0.0759*** 0.0784***
(0.00616) (0.00657) (0.00628) (0.00624)
log size 0.0136*** 0.0091*** 0.0105***
(0.00135) (0.00128) (0.00130)
Observations 4779 4779 4779 4779
R2 0.029 0.049 0.233 0.251
Notes: Table presents regression results based on a firm-level sample, with
the share workers performing complex tasks in a firm as dependent vari-
able. Firm controls include industry, firm size, and the firm type. Worker
characteristics are averaged on the firm level, i.e. the share of foreign and
female workers and the average age and tenure of workers in the firm. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at: * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
term between the firm type and the educational variable.
Column 1 of Table 9, presents the estimation results. The interpretation of the
coefficients is then as follows: The coefficient of the educational variable is the ex-
pected effect of being a medium/high skilled worker among the non-international
firms, i.e. the difference in pay between a low and medium (25%) or low and high
(41.7%) educated worker, where both are employed by local firms. The coefficients of
the interaction between firm type and the educational variable, gives the differential
effect of a particular worker type being employed by a different firm type. The effect
of being employed by an exporter, relative to a local firms, is 7.35% for low-, 0.34%
for medium- and 0.32% for high educated workers. The respective effect for MNEs is
11.4% for low-, 6.97% for medium- and 5.12% for high educated workers. The coeffi-
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cient for a medium skilled worker in an exporter is significant at the 10%significance
level, all other coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
These results suggest that MNEs, on average, reward workers across all skill types
more than non-international firms, whereas the effect for exporters is either low or not
significant. This finding nuances the results regarding firms’ employment structure
and worker-firm-type complementarities. MNEs have a workforce of a higher average
ability, which receives higher wages across all educational groups, which confirms the
hypothesis concerning skill-internationality complementarity. The workforce of ex-
porting firms is, on average, more skilled than the workforce of local firms. However,
in terms of wages more skilled workers employed by exporting firms do not have an
advantage relative to their domestic counterparts.
Differences in pay by task requirement
Column 2 of Table 9 captures the results of regressions with the interaction of the
firm type with the variable measuring the complexity of tasks performed. The in-
terpretation of the coefficients follows the same logic as above for the interaction
with the educational variable. All estimated coefficients in this specification are
statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
The coefficient of the task complexity variable is the expected effect of a worker
in a skilled,complex or highly complex task among the non-international firms, i.e.
the difference in pay between an unskilled and skilled (13.3%), unskilled vs complex
(65.4%), where workers are employed by local firms. The differential effect of being
employed by an exporter, relative to a local firms, is 3.3% for unskilled-, 1.2% for
skilled-, 1.0% for complex. The respective effect for MNEs is 9.5% for unskilled-
, 7.4% for skilled- and 7.2% for complex tasks. The estimation results provide a
more detailed picture of what type of task is particularly rewarded by different firm
types: MNEs pay relatively more for each task performed , while the respective ex-
porter coefficients are smaller for all task types. The results in section 3 indicated
that both unobserved and observed worker characteristics are important factors in
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Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. Con-
trols included are the interaction between the firm type
and the educational variable (low, medium, high) in
column 1 and interaction terms between the firm type
and the level of complexity of tasks performed (low,
medium, high), as presented in column 2. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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driving differences in pay across the different firm types. Table 10 provides a more
nuanced picture of which type of firm rewards different worker types more. The
analysis highlights that MNEs, on average, reward highly educated workers and em-
ployees performing highly complex tasks more than local firms and exporters. which
is additional evidence for worker-firm-type complementarities in the underlying firm
technologies.
1.5 Concluding Comments
Using German linked employer-employee data, this study provides empirical evidence
for the wage premium of exporters and multinational enterprises. I find that, even
after controlling for observed and unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity, firms
participating in global markets pay higher wages than firms that operate only in
the domestic market, where MNEs pay higher premia than exporters. In particular,
estimation results from the regression including individual and match-specific fixed
effects, seem to confirm some degree of assortative matching on unobserved worker
characteristics.
Furthermore, I explore the sorting pattern with regard to unobserved and ob-
served worker skills in terms of educational level and the complexity of tasks per-
formed. The estimation results suggest that exporters and MNEs employ, on average,
more skilled workers and a larger share of workers with better unobserved ability.
To the extent that unobserved and observed individual characteristics also matter
for firm outcomes, these findings suggest that there is a ’skill-internationality’ com-
plementarity.
In summary, my findings exhibit a clear hierarchy of firms’ international activities
with regard to wage premia and the average observed and unobserved workforce
ability, where MNEs can be ranked highest. This observed pattern between the
ranking of wages and the skills required, suggests worker-firm-type complementary.
Traditionally, exporter and MNE premia have been interpreted as wage differ-
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ences received by ”identical” workers at different types of firms. My results show
that unobserved worker ability varies across the different firm types in a system-
atic way. This suggests that these workers may not be identical after all and that
there are reasons to believe that the observed sorting pattern on unobserved ability,
especially prevalent in MNEs, is not mere coincidence. Potentially, MNEs are bet-
ter at identifying econometrically unobserved talent? This merits further empirical
and theoretical investigation. In the second chapter of my thesis I provide a unified
framework for analysing the complex interplay between diverse forms of globalisa-
tion, labour market frictions and wage inequality. In doing so I build a theoretical
model that is able to explain my empirical findings from this first chapter of my the-
sis. The theory explains positive exporter and multinational premia for employment
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Labour Market Rigidities and
Wage Inequality
2.1 Introduction
The structure of global interdependence has changed from a trade-oriented to a
production-oriented system, where multinational firms are regarded as the locus
of transnational economic activities.1 Differences in firms’ mode of foreign market
entry, in turn, may have diverse implications for wage inequality within and across
countries.
Figure 1 presents the share of workers in firms with different modes of foreign
market entry in Germany between 2006 and 2010. The Figure highlights that a
growing share of the labour force is employed by firms that are active in international
markets either via exporting or FDI activity. During the same period, Germany’s
labour market was subjected to a major labour market reform with the aim to
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the labour market.2
1Shatz and Venables (2000), Navaretti et al. (2004) and Antràs and Yeaple (2014) provide some
stylized facts concerning recent developments regarding exporting and multinational activity.
2The reform is also known as ’Hartz 4’, which was implemented in 2003-2005. The set of reforms
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Notes: The figure shows the share of workers in domestic, exporting and FDI establishments in
Germany. Firms are classified as: (1) Domestic , i.e. firms with no international activity, (2)
exporters, which are firms that report positive exporting, and (3) ’FDI’, are firms that report
inward/outward FDI. The analysis is based on German linked employer-employee (LIAB) data for
the year 2006 and 2010. The sample corresponds to all private sector firms with at least 5
employees and workers between 16 and 65 years for which data is available on a set of individual
characteristics.
Figure 2.1: Share of Workers in Exporting and FDI Firms in Germany (2006-2010)
These developments motivate the following questions I address in this paper:
First, to what extent and through which mechanism do different modes of foreign
market entry affect labour market outcomes within a country? Second, how do insti-
tutional changes, such as labour market reforms, condition the relationship between
these aspects of globalisation and labour market outcomes.
To answer these questions, I build a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium
model that links these two distinct forms of globalisation, namely trade and FDI,
to differences in wages, employment and workforce composition across firms. The
implemented may loosely be grouped into those reducing reservation wages, those increasing the
efficiency of the job search process, and those allowing employers more flexibility. For a discussion
on the labour market implications of these reforms see for example Ochel (2005), Jacobi and Kluve
(2006) and Fahr and Sunde (2009).
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mechanism is based on a model with ex-ante homogeneous workers, heterogeneous
firms and search and matching frictions as in Helpman et al. (2017), within a trade
model with monopolistic competition á la Melitz et al. (2004). By including foreign
direct investment by multinational firms, this paper provides novel insights into
the interaction between firm specific factors and firms’ international activities in
determining wage inequality and in particular, the multinational wage premium.
The model features three sources of firm heterogeneity. Besides the by now
standard productivity heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003), the model additionally in-
corporates firm heterogeneity with respect to the size of fixed costs of market entry,
and heterogeneity in the cost of screening workers. While the first source of het-
erogeneity may be attributed to a firm’s ability to use the given resources of the
firm, the efficiency in screening relates to a firm’s ability to find the right labour
inputs.3 Moreover, heterogeneous screening costs allow for variation in wages across
firms after controlling for their employment size and international activity, while id-
iosyncratic market entry costs allow some small low-wage firms to profitably engage
in international activities and some large high-wage firms to serve only the domestic
market.
Firms and workers meet in a labour market characterized by Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides-type search and matching frictions. These search frictions give rise to
multilateral bargaining between a firm and its workers. Workers are heterogeneous
ex-post, however, ex-ante a worker’s ability is not directly observable by his em-
ployer. Firms have access to a costly screening technology which allows them to
identify workers with ability below a certain ability threshold, but it cannot iden-
tify the precise ability of each worker. Due to complementarieties between the firm
productivity and the average ability of its workers, firms have an incentive to screen
workers to exclude those which fall below the chosen ability-threshold and in so
doing, improve the average ability of their workforce. Hence, the model features
3Alternatively, the cost of screening can be interpreted as the unobserved part of a firm’s pro-
ductivity, as this kind of information is usually unavailable to the econometrician.
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imperfect assortative matching on unobservables in the labour market.
The choice of serving the foreign market is modeled as in Melitz et al. (2004),
where firms can choose between two ways of foreign market access. They can either
export domestically-produced goods or they can supply the destination market by
setting up a foreign affiliate (FDI). In both cases firms need to pay fixed costs to
enter the foreign market. While exporting entails additional variable trade costs,
FDI saves transport costs, but duplicates production facilities and therefore, requires
higher fixed costs. When engaging in FDI activity, a multinational firm can transfer
its screening technology to their foreign affiliate at no extra cost, but it needs to hire
workers from the labour market in the foreign country, subject to the labour market
rigidities of this country.4
The first main result relates to the selection of firms into different modes of
foreign market entry. Firm characteristics are systematically related to international
activity, where firms with superior average characteristics - in terms of productivity,
screening efficiency or fixed export/FDI cost - become exporters and firms with an
even higher firm specific triplet, serve foreign markets via FDI. Furthermore, I show
that the trade-off between exporting and FDI activity is determined by the difference
between fixed costs of FDI and exporting, the size of variable trade costs, and the
relative labour market friction of the two countries. Intuitively, the more flexible the
foreign labour market and the larger the fixed and variable trade costs of exporting
are, the more attractive firms will find it to serve the foreign market via FDI.
Second, firms with higher average characteristics are larger, more selective in
the labour market and since higher-ability workforces are more costly to replace
in the bargaining game, they also pay higher wages. Through this mechanism,
internationalising firms are larger, have workforces of higher average ability and pay
higher wages than non-internationalising firms. Therefore, this framework features
4Bloom et al. (2012) provide evidence that US multinationals transplant their business models
to their overseas affiliates and that tougher “people management” practices are related to US firms’
productivity advantages. They show that this holds for both domestically based US firms as well
as US multinationals operating in Europe.
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residual wage inequality in the sense that ex ante identical workers receive different
wages depending on whether they are matched with an exporter, a multinational
firm or non-internationalising firms. Moreover, the mode of foreign market entry
exhibits a clear hierarchy, where FDI firms can be ranked higher with regard to size,
average workforce ability and wage premia.
Third, a distinctive feature of my framework is the presence of inward FDI (from
the perspective of the home country), which introduces a new channel through which
globalisation can affect labour market outcomes. A key assumption is that hiring and
wage bargaining take place on the plant level, which implies that employment size and
wages may differ within the same multinational firm, across its two affiliated plants.
Furthermore, the ability of multinationals to transfer their screening technology to
their foreign affiliates, gives rise to differences in the size, screening intensity and
hence, workforce composition and wages between domestically owned multinationals
(outward FDI) and foreign owned multinationals (inward FDI).5 Importantly, this is
true for multinational firms with identical firm characteristics, but that only differ
with respect to their country of origin. Whether inward or outward FDI firms pay
more is driven by differences in labour market frictions across countries.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the effects
of globalisation on labour market outcomes in the presence of labor market frictions.6
My framework shares some basic features of heterogeneous firm models that link
firms’ employment and wage outcomes to trade participation through a Melitz (2003)
mechanism (e.g. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman et al. (2010), Felbermayr
et al. (2011) and Coşar et al. (2016)).7 In particular my model can be viewed as
an extension of Helpman et al. (2017). Motivated by stylised facts, they build a
5Fabbri et al. (2003) suggest that multinationals can more easily substitute away from labor in
any one country, which may be an additional channel for differences in employment size and wages.
6My paper is also related to research that emphasizes a country’s flexibility in the labour market
as a source of comparative advantage. See for example Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Cuñat
and Melitz (2012).
7Many other recent papers examine the effects of trade on labour market outcomes, such as
Davidson et al. (1999), Davidson et al. (2008)Amiti and Davis (2011), Dix-Carneiro (2014), and
Grossman et al. (2017)
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theoretical model that focuses on wage inequality between firms for workers with
similar observed characteristics. They extend Helpman et al. (2010) which features
heterogeneity in firm productivity, to also incorporate heterogeneity in the cost of
screening workers and the size of fixed exporting costs. In doing so their theory
explains positive exporter premia for employment and wages and predicts imperfect
correlations between firm employment, wages and export status. Their findings are
in line with other empirical studies that establish the existence of the exporter wage
premium, such as Bernard et al. (1995) Schank et al. (2007), Verhoogen (2008), and
Baumgarten (2013).
My main point of departure from Helpman et al. (2017) is the introduction of
multinational activity. This part of my theory is based on the framework by Melitz
et al. (2004).8 They build upon the Melitz (2003) trade model to explain the decisions
of heterogeneous firms to serve foreign markets through exports or local subsidiary
sales. These modes of market access have different relative costs, some of which are
sunk (such as entry costs) while others vary with sales (such as transport costs and
tariffs). Relative to FDI, exporting involves lower sunk costs but higher per-unit
cost. The idea is that, firms engage in FDI activity when the gains from avoiding
transport costs outweigh the costs of maintaining capacity in multiple markets.9
Their model predicts that the least productive firms serve only the domestic market,
that relatively more productive firms export, and that the most productive firms
engage in FDI. They provide empirical evidence supporting this sorting pattern,
which are in line with findings by others studies, such as Head and Ries (2003) and
Tomiura (2007).
Finally, as my paper provides a theoretical explanation for the multinational
wage premium, it contributes to the growing literature examining the implications of
8Other theories of exporting and FDI are for example Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard
(1993) and Markusen and Venables (2000).
9This is more generally known as the proximity-concentration trade-off. Brainard (1993) shows
how trade costs, market size, and plant-level economies of scale interact to explain the export and
FDI decision of firms producing differentiated products.
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multinational activity for labour market outcomes. Theoretical contributions include
Fosfuri et al. (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002), Egger and Kreickemeier (2013) and
Gumpert (2015) and Heyman et al. (2007), Görg et al. (2007) and Martins (2011)
provide empirical evidence for the multinational wage premium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and solves for general equilibrium. Section 3, provides a discussion of the model
implications and section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
I build a two-sector, two-country model, where firms in the differentiated product
sector can choose between exporting and (horizontal) FDI to enter foreign markets.
International activity is based on a proximity-concentration tradeoff as in Melitz
et al. (2004). Furthermore, heterogeneous firms meet with ex-ante identical workers
in a labour market characterized by matching frictions similar to Helpman et al.
(2010) and Helpman et al. (2017). The main prediction of the model relates to the
distribution of wages and employment across firms that engage in international ac-




There are two countries, home and foreign, where foreign variables are denoted by an
asterisk. A country is endowed with a unit measure of identical households of size L.
Each member of the household has one indivisible unit of labour which is supplied
inelastically with zero disutility. Consumers are risk neutral and have preferences
represented by a utility function which is defined over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate (C)
of a homogeneous good (q0) and a real consumption index of differentiated varieties
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(Q)10:
C = qα0Q1−α, 0 < α < 1 (2.1)
where α is a share parameter.




p(j)q(j)dj ≤ Y, (2.2)
where I have chosen the homogeneous good as the numeraire and j indexes varieties
and J is the set of varieties within the differentiated sector; q(j) denotes consumption
of variety j and p(j) is its price. Y denotes the household’s aggregate income.







, 0 < β < 1 (2.3)
where the elasticity of substitution between varieties is given by β.11
The Household maximises its expected utility by choosing how much to consume
of each good and where to send its labour to work. More precisely, it allocates its
L workers between the two sectors, where L is the sum of workers searching in the
homogeneous (l0) and differentiated sector (l). The homogeneous product sector has
no labour market frictions and workers searching for jobs in this sector are expected
to be employed with certainty and receive the wage w0. The differentiated sector is
characterised by search frictions, where workers searching in this sector meet firms
with some positive probability. Unmatched workers become unemployed. Condi-
tional on being matched, workers learn the match-specific productivity, after which,
they may be hired and receive a wage, or enter into unemployment. The value of
10For simplicity I consider a single differentiated sector. The analysis can be generalised to the
case of multiple differentiated sectors.
11While I here only display expressions for the home country, analogous relationships hold for
foreign variables.
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being unemployed is assumed to be equal to zero.
Firm problem
In the homogeneous sector firms are perfectly competitive, and one unit of labor
is required to produce one unit of output. There are no trade costs. I focus on
equilibria with incomplete specialisation, in which every country produces both ho-
mogeneous and differentiated goods. Under this assumption, normalising the price
in the homogeneous sector to one, implies that the wage payed by a homogeneous
good producers is also equal to one (w0 = 1) in both countries. Below the conditions
for incomplete specialisation shall be further defined.
The differentiated sector consists of a large number of monopolistically com-
petitive firms, each supplying a distinct horizontally-differentiated variety. A firm
revenue in this sector depends on the prices p(j) of an individual variety j and a
firm’s output y(j):
r(j) = p(j)y(j) (2.4)
A firm can choose to enter the differentiated sector by paying an entry cost of
fe > 0. The firm then has to decide whether to exit, produce solely for the domestic
market or to produce for both the domestic and foreign market. Production in the
domestic market involves a fixed cost of efd > 0 units of the numeraire. The fixed
cost is common to all firms and e is firm specific, independently distributed and
drawn from a distribution Ge. The choice of serving the foreign market is modeled
as in Melitz et al. (2004), where firms can choose between two ways of foreign market
access: They can either export domestically-produced goods or they can supply the
destination market by setting up a foreign affiliate (FDI).12 In both cases a firm has
to incur fixed costs when entering the foreign market, i.e. efx > 0 for exporting and
12I here assume that diseconomies of scope prevent firms from serving the foreign market through
both, exporting and FDI activity.
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efi > 0 for FDI activity, respectively. Furthermore, exporting is subject to iceberg
variable trade cost, such that τ > 1 units of a variety must be exported in order for
one unit to arrive in the foreign market. Relative to exports, FDI saves transport
costs, but duplicates production facilities and therefore requires higher fixed costs,
which requires fi > fx.
Output of each variety (y) depends on the productivity of the firm (z), the
measure of workers hired (h), and the average ability of these workers (ā):
y = zhγ ā, 0 < γ < 1 (2.5)
where the productivity of the firm z is independently distributed and drawn from
a distribution Gz(z).13 The firm technology in (4) has the following important fea-
tures.14 First, γ < 1 implies that there are decreasing returns to hiring more workers
as, for example captured in the span of control model by Lucas (1978). Second,
the productivity of a worker depends on the average ability of the entire workforce
in the firm. Third, there is a complementarity between a firm’s productivity and
workers’ ability. As will be shown below, these assumptions imply that firms face
a trade-off between the quality and quantity of hired workers and worker ability
matters relatively more for more productive firms.
The labour market is characterized by search frictions, where a firm has to pay
bn units of the numeraire in order to be matched randomly with a measure n of
workers.15
Workers differ in their ability, which is drawn from a Pareto distribution with
support on [1,∞) and shape parameter k > 1: G(a) = 1 − a−k for a  1. Worker
13Since in equilibrium all firms with the same productivity behave symmetrically, firms are in-
dexed by z.
14Helpman et al. (2010) show that this production function can be derived from human capital
complementarities (e.g., production takes place in teams and the productivity of a worker depends
on the average productivity of her team), or from a model of a managerial time constraint (e.g. a
manager with a fixed amount of time who needs to allocate some time to every worker).
15For simplicity I assume that the hiring cost b is exogenous. Making b a function of labor market
conditions, as in Helpman et al. (2010), does not affect the main results.
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ability is assumed to be match-specific, and it is unknown both to the firm and to the
worker. However, once the match is formed, the firm has access to a costly screening
technology which allows it to identify workers with ability below a certain ability
threshold ac, but it cannot identify the precise ability of each worker. Screening
costs increase with the ability threshold and equal caδc/dδ, where c > 0 and δ > 0
are common to all firms and d is firm specific, independently distributed and drawn
from a distribution Gd(d). The intuition of this screening technology is that more
complex and costlier tests are required for higher ability cutoffs.
Figure 2.2: Timing of Decisions
The timing of decisions is as follows. Firms choose to enter and pay the free entry
cos (fe) Each firm learns its idiosyncratic draw (z, d, e), corresponding to productiv-
ity, screening costs, and fixed costs of market entry, respectively. Given this triplet,
the firm chooses whether or not to produce, whether to serve only the domestic
market or to also serve the foreign market, either via exporting or by setting up a
production plant abroad. Each firm then pays the search costs and matches with its
chosen number of workers. After matching, the firm chooses its screening threshold
and employs the workers with abilities above this threshold. Firms with FDI activity
are able to transfer their screening technology to their foreign affiliate. Once these
decisions have been made, the firm and its hired employees engage in bilateral Nash
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bargaining with equal weights over the division of revenue from production in the
manner proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).16 The outcome of the bargaining
game implies that the the firm receives the fraction 1/(1 + βγ) of revenues, while
each worker receives the fraction βγ/(1 + βγ) of average revenue per worker.
A firm that has searched for n workers and has chosen the ability cutoff ac hires
h = n [1−G(ac)] = n (1/ac)k workers whose expected ability is ā = E {a|a ≥ ac} =




where output of a firm is increasing in the ability cutoff ac. I further make an as-
sumption on the following parameters which is maintained throughout.
Technical Assumption 1: γ < 1/k
This assumption implies that there are sufficiently strong diminishing returns rela-
tive to the dispersion of ability such that a firm can increase its output by not hiring
the least productive workers. Therefore, firms have an incentive to screen workers
to identify low-ability matches.17
Equilibrium
In equilibrium the household takes prices and wages as given and maximises its
utility subject to the budget constraint. It allocates its labour endowment between
the two sectors to generate income and then uses its labour income to purchase its
utility maximising bundle of goods.
Firms maximise profits subject to fixed costs of market entry, search and screening
16See Appendix A for a detailed description of the the wage bargaining outcome.
17If γ > 1/k no firm wants to screen because employing even the least productive worker raises
the firm’s output and revenue, while screening is costly.
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costs. The optimal choices of the firm crucially depend on the idiosyncratic draw
z, d and e. As it is the triplet as a whole that matters, I will subsequently define Z
as a function of the firm’s idiosyncratic shocks to describe equilibrium outcomes.18
The equilibrium will then consist of Z-cutoffs in the home and foreign country for
production, exporting and FDI activity, which in turn yields five conditions that char-
acterise the equilibrium in the home country: a distribution of prices, wages, employ-
ment and ability thresholds in the differentiated sector (p(Z), w(Z), y(Z), h(Z), ac(Z))
and an analogous equilibrium vector for the foreign country ((p∗(Z), w∗(Z), y∗(Z),
h∗(Z), a∗c(Z)). The set of prices and quantities are such that all markets clear: sup-




The consumer’s maximisation problem implies that consumers spend α on the ho-
mogeneous good and 1− α on the differentiated good. Thus, aggregate expenditure
in the differentiated sector is given by E = PQ and in terms of expenditure shares
can be expressed as
PQ = (1− α)Y, (2.7)
where P is the price index in the differentiated sector and is the dual of the demand










where the price of a variety is given by
p(j) = PQ1−βy(j)−(1−β) (2.9)
18See equation (20) for the exact functional form of Z(z, d, e).
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Income
The market clearing condition for the labour market is given by the following equa-
tion:
L = l0 + l, (2.10)
which implies that aggregate labour supply is equal to the sum of workers searching
in the homogeneous (l0) and differentiated sector (l). In equilibrium workers are
indifferent between searching in the two sector. This requires that the expected
wage rate in the differentiated sector equals the wage in the homogeneous sector. As
expected income equals one in each sector, each country’s aggregate labour income
is determined by its labour endowment:
Y = L, (2.11)




In the main analysis I assume that parameters are such that both countries pro-
duce the homogeneous good. As discussed in Helpman et al. (2010)) incomplete
specialization can be ensured by appropriate choice of labour endowments (L,L∗)
and relative preferences for the homogeneous and differentiated goods (α).
Firm choices
Revenues
Given the solution of the household problem, a firm’s revenue can be expressed in
terms of its output supplied y(Z) and a demand shifter A for the sector:
r(Z) = Ay(Z)β, A ≡ PQ1−β (2.13)
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The demand shifter A is a measure of product market competition, increasing in the
sectoral expenditure and decreasing in the sectoral price index P . Since every firm
is small relative to the sector, firms take this demand shifter as given.
Given consumer love of variety and fixed production costs, no firm will ever
serve the export or FDI market without also serving the domestic market. Total
output of a firm is the sum of production for the domestic and the foreign market,
which the firm serves either via exporting or through multinational production. In
order to distinguish between plants in the home country and abroad, I introduce
the subscripts H and F , where H refers to production in the home country and F
relates to production in the foreign country. Hence, production by a home firm for
the home market is denoted as yH(Z) and yF (z) is the amount produced by a home
firm in the foreign market through FDI activity.19
Total revenues can then be rewritten as the sum of revenues from the home plant
rH(Z) and the foreign plant rF (Z) :
r(Z) = ΥH(Z)1−βAyH(Z)β + Ii(Z)A∗yF (Z)β (2.14)
where Ix ∈ 0, 1 is an indicator function for whether a firm exports and Ii ∈ 0, 1 for
FDI activity respectively. Note that if a firm decides to serve the foreign market via
exporting, i.e. Ix = 1, then the indicator function for FDI activity will be Ii = 0
and vice versa if the firm engages in FDI the indicator function Ii equals 1 and Ix is
equal to zero. Moreover, ΥH(Z) refers to the “market access” variable:









which depends on whether a home producer, in addition to selling in the home mar-
ket, also serves the foreign market via exporting. The equation further highlights
that exporting activity does not only depend on the relative demand shifters of the
19For simplicity, I exclude the possibility of exports by foreign affiliates. See Appendix of Melitz
et al. (2004), for an extension.
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foreign and home country, but also on the variable trade cost τ .20
Search and Screening Choice
The solution to the firm’s problem is solved in a recursive way: Anticipating this
bargaining outcome, a firm maximizes its profits by choosing the number of workers
to match with in the home plant(nH) and in the FDI-plant (nF ), the screening

























− bnH − Iib∗nF −
c
dδ
aδc − efd − Ixefx − Iiefi

(2.15)
The firm’s first order conditions for the measure of workers sampled for the home
establishment (nH) and for the foreign affiliate (nF ) are:
βγ
1 + βγ rH(Z) = bnH(Z) (2.16)
βγ
1 + βγ rF (Z) = bnF (Z) (2.17)
And first order condition with respect to the screening ability threshold (ac) is given
by
β(1− γk)




Equations (16) and (17) can be combined to express the optimal sampling decision
20The market access variable ΥH(z) is derived by noting that a home producer with exporting











and output of a home plant can then be written as yH(Z) = yd(Z)ΥH(z)
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in terms of total revenues (r(Z)):
βγ














As a result, a firm’s optimal choice depends on the relative level of labour market
frictions (b/b∗) and demand shifters (A∗/A), rather than the absolute values.21 Equa-
tions (18) and (19) imply that, ceteris paribus, firms with larger revenue interview
more workers (higher nH) and screen more intensively (higher ac) and consequently,
hire workers with higher average ability. I next make an assumption that ensures
that firms that screen to a higher ability cutoff also hire more workers (higher hH):
Technical Assumption 2: δ > k
Using the firms’ first-order conditions (18) and (19), firm revenue (14) and the
production technology (6), we can solve explicitly for firm revenue as a function of













where κr ≡ (k/k− 1)Γ(βγ/1 +βγ)βγ/Γ[β(1− γk)/1 +βγ]β(1−γk)/δk and Γ ≡ 1−βγ−
β(1−γk)/δ. Technical Asumption 1 and 2 together imply that Γ > 0, which ensures
that revenues are increasing in firm characteristics.
Furthermore, Υ(Z) denotes a firm’s aggregate market access variable, including
21See Appendix B for a detailed derivation of the first order conditions.
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exporting and FDI activity and is hence, given by
Υ(Z) ≡

1 if Ix(Z) = Ii(Z) = 0


























which includes additional revenue premium of exporters (Υx) and of FDI activity
(Υi), depending on which mode of foreign market access is chosen by the firm. Using
the first order conditions and the expression of revenues in (20), firm profits can be
rewritten as
π(Z) = Γ1 + βγ r(Z)− efd − Ix(Z)efx − Ii(Z)efi (2.22)
where I define the combination of firm-specific idiosyncratic draws as Z ≡ zd(1−γk)/δ/eΓ/β.
Firm Outcomes
Wages are determined by wage bargaining as described above, where bargaining
takes place at the plant level. The wage payed to workers in establishments of home














These equations imply that the wage is equal to the replacement cost of a worker,
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which is proportional to the search cost b and increasing in the screening cutoff ac.22.
From (18),(19) and (20) it follows that if the revenue premium from FDI activity
(Υi) is larger than the one from exporting (Υx), firms with multinational activity
are more selective in the labour market and hence, pay higher wages than exporting
and local firms. I will further discuss the implications of FDI and exporting activity
for wage inequality in section 3.
As stated above, if δ > k, the ability threshold ac is increasing with h and we
can state that the model exhibits an employer-size wage premium, where firms that
employ more workers (and screen more intensively), pay higher wages.23
Next, we can find the analogous expressions for employment in home and foreign
plants by noting that h ≡ na−kc . Employment can then be expressed as function
of revenues of the plant which is hiring the workers, i.e. either by the home plant















where κh ≡ (βγ/1 + βγ)(β(1 − γk)/1 + βγ)−k/δ. The implications for employment
are as follows. Exporters and FDI firms both hire more workers than firms that are
only active in the domestic market and for Υi > Υx, multinational firms tend to be
largest in terms of their workforce. Furthermore, firms which generate more revenue
in the home plant also hire more workers, holding revenue in the foreign affiliate
constant. Vice versa holds for firms which generate more revenues in the foreign
plant.
22Note that conditional on being sampled, the expected wage is the same same across firms:
w(Z)h(Z)/n(Z) = b
23This feature of the model is in line with empirical findings that the employer-size wage premium
is partly explained by differences in the unobserved heterogeneity of workers across firms as shown
by Abowd et al. (1999), Card et al. (2013) and Song et al. (2015).
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Export and FDI Choice
As a result of fixed costs of production (fd, fx and fi, respectively) and variable trade
costs, a firm’s decision whether or not to produce and to export or engage in FDI,
imply that there is a zero-profit cutoff for the firm-specific triplet Z(z, d, e) , for which
a firm will be willing to serve the domestic market, Zd, choose to export, Zx and if
the observed productivity draw is high enough, Zi, the firm will find it profitable to
set up a foreign affiliate. This implies the following order of cutoffs: Zi ≥ Zx ≥ Zd.
Using the expression for profits in (22) we can find the zero profit-cutoffs.
The Z-cutoff below which firms exit is determined by the requirement that a firm
with this combination of z, d, e, makes zero profits, i.e. π(Zd) = 0. Hence, a firm
will produce if













The analogous export-cutoff can be found by noting that the firm’s zero profit condi-
tions require that firms are indifferent between serving only the domestic market and
serving both the domestic and foreign market through exporting (π(Θx)−π(Θd) = 0).
A firm’s exporting decision is determined by the following two equations :































where the FDI Zi cutoff above which firms set up a foreign affiliate (Zi) is determined
by the requirement that a firm is indifferent between serving the foreign market via
exporting and FDI (π(Zi)− π(Zx) = 0). Consequently, firms engage in FDI activity
if
Z ≥ Zi. (2.30)
Note that theoretically there are many possible cases for the order of cutoffs. For
64
example, it could be that only the most productive export and less productive firms
do FDI, which implies Zx ≥ Zi ≥ Zd.24 However, here I am focusing on the case
where all firms that export or do FDI, also serve the domestic market, and firms
that produce for the domestic market may or may not participate in international
activities. Moreover, I assume that only the most productive firms engage in FDI.
This implies the following order of cutoffs Zi ≥ Zx ≥ Zd, as described above. Under
the assumption that fi > fx it is sufficient to require that the revenue premium from
FDI activity (Υi) to be larger than for exporting (Υx) in order to ensure that the
cutoff of FDI to be greater than the exporting cutoff (see (28) and (29)). Hence,
whether a firm will choose to engage in FDI activity, rather than exporting, will
depend on the difference between the fixed costs of FDI (fi) and exporting (fx),
and on the difference between the firm revenue premium of FDI activity (Υi) and
exporting (Υx). The latter difference in turn, depends on the size of the variable trade
costs τ ; the closer τ to 1, the larger Υx, which implies that firms find it relatively
more profitable to export as iceberg trade costs vanish. Furthermore, equations (27)
- (20) highlight that firm characteristics through Z(z, d, e) are systematically related
to export and FDI participation. Given this triplet, the distribution of exporters and
firms engaging in FDI, depends not only on the distribution of productivities (z),
but also on the the distribution of d and e between exporters and domestic firms,
and between exporters and FDI-firms.
Moreover, these cutoffs depend on two dimensions of trade openness in (27), (28)
and (39). First, they depend on an extensive margin of trade openness, as captured
by the ratio of the firm-specific variable Z-cutoffs Zd/Zx, which determines the frac-
tion of exporting firms. Similarly, Zx/Zi, which, in turn, determines the fraction of
firms engaging in FDI activity. Second, the cutoffs depend on an intensive margin
of trade openness, as captured by the two market access variables, Υx > 1 and the
revenue mark-up of FDI activity, which determine the ratio of revenues from domes-
24We can also think of cases where everyone who produces also does FDI and there is no exporting,
i.e. Zd ≥ Zi ≥ Zx. However, this case seems empirically less relevant.
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tic sales and exporting or FDI.
Entry
In equilibrium, we also require the free entry condition to hold, which equates the























 dGZ = fe
(2.31)
where Ix(Z) = 1 only if Zx ≤ Z < Zi and Ix(Z) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, Ii(Z) = 1
for Z ≥ Zi and is zero otherwise. Evaluating the integrals in (31) using a Pareto
distribution, together with the cutoff condition in (27), we can express the free entry
condition as a function of the exit cutoff Zd.
Market clearing
Next, the mass of firms within the sector (M) can be determined from the market
clearing condition that total domestic expenditure on differentiated varieties equals
the sum of the revenues of domestic and foreign firms that supply varieties to the
domestic market:












The equilibrium will then consist of Z-cutoffs in the home and foreign country for
production, exporting and FDI activity, which in turn yields five conditions that char-
acterise the equilibrium in the home country: a distribution of prices, wages, employ-
ment and ability thresholds in the differentiated sector (p(Z), w(Z), y(Z), h(Z), ac(Z))
and an analogous equilibrium vector for the foreign country ((p∗(Z), w∗(Z), y∗(Z),
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h∗(Z), a∗c(Z)). The set of prices and quantities are such that all markets clear: sup-
ply matches demand on the labour and on the goods market. The sectoral labor
force (l) can be determined from the outcome of the bargaining game, where the











There are five equations that characterize the equilibrium in each country as a func-
tion of the three Z-cutoffs.
Equations (27), (28), (29) and (30) determine the cutoffs for the home country
(Zd, Zx, Zi) and three analogous expressions yield the cutoffs for the foreign country
(Z∗d , Z∗x, Z∗i ).
Combining the fact that first, the demand shifter is a function of total expenditure
A = PQ1−β and second, that Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that expenditure of a
good is a constant share (1− α) of income (Y ), i.e. PQ = (1− α)Y :
A = [(1− α)L]1−β P β (2.34)
where I used the fact that income is equal to labour endowments from (11). We can
again make use of an equivalent expression for the demand shifter to obtain A∗.
The expression for the demand shifters, together with the cutoffs and the mass of






∗,M,M∗). Together, with the firm outcomes in (18) - (26) as func-
tions of Z, fully describe the model equilibrium.
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2.3 Model Implications
In this section, I will use this general equilibrium model of two countries to further
discuss the implications of the model for wage inequality. Furthermore, I will con-
duct a comparative statics exercise to derive results on the impact of labour market
frictions on firm’s choice of foreign market entry, and the resulting implications for
the fraction of exporting and FDI firms in the economy.
2.3.1 Exporter and MNE Wage Premia
Wage Premia
I will now consider the implications of exporting and FDI for wages and the resulting
difference in pay between exporters and multinationals in the home country . I start
by taking logs of the wage equation in (23), and (24), which establishes the following
relationship between a firm’s choice of international activity and wages
lnwH = µH +
k















ln d∗ + Γ
β
ln e∗ (2.36)
where µH includes parameters that are common to all home country producers in
their home establishments and µ∗H refers to affiliated plants where the source country
is foreign. The remaining parameters, in turn, can be interpreted as coefficients of
a wage regression with the firm type and the log of different firm characteristics
(Z(z, d, e)). Furthermore, equation (36) captures wages of foreign owned in affiliates
in the home country and hence, from the perspective of Home captures inward FDI.
The relationship between firms’ international activities and firm characteristics
can be described as follows. Similar to Helpman et al. (2017), heterogeneity in firm
productivity (z) drives differences in firm revenue, employment size and international
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activity. Heterogeneity in the screening efficiency (d) allow for differences in wages
across firms after controlling for their employment size and mode of foreign market
access, while idiosyncratic market entry costs (e) allow some small low-wage firms to
engage in exporting and FDI activity and vice versa some large high-wage firms to
serve only the home market. Consequently, incorporating these three idiosyncratic
shocks allows the model to produce a positive but imperfect correlation between
wages, international activity and employment, as observed in the data.
Export vs FDI
First, we will consider the case in which firms do not participate in FDI activity, i.e
Ii = 0, but allow for exporting Ix = 1. The effect of exporting on wages, controlling
for other firm characteristics, is then equal to (k/δΓ)(1 − β) ln Υx. Due to fixed
costs of exporting, there is a discrete increase in wages for exporters, as exporting
implies that Υ(Z) increases from 1 to Υx > 1. Next, let us consider the case for
FDI (Ii = 1). Similarly to exporting, as a result of fixed costs, revenues increase
discretely at the cutoff (Zi) for entering the FDI market. While exporting implies
that Υ(Z) increases from 1 to Υx > 1, FDI activity comes along with an increase of
Υi. The multinational wage premium is hence given by (k/δΓ)(1− γβ) ln Υi.
Whether the wage premium of exporters or multinationals is larger, depends on
the ’coefficient’ and on the size of the market access variables themselves. First, the
coefficient for FDI is greater then the analogous exporter coefficient ((1 − γβ) >
(1 − β)), suggesting that the multinational wage premium may be larger. Second,
both market access variables depend on the relative labour market friction (b/b∗) and
on the relative demand shifter (A∗/A). Additionally, Υx is a function of the iceberg
transportation cost (τ). Empirically, trade costs vary a lot across countries and the
magnitude of trade costs depends on the specific pair of countries trading with one
another. As Υx is decreasing in τ , countries with high bilateral trade costs have
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greater multinational wage premia relative to the exporter premium (Υi > Υx).25
On the other hand, if barriers to trade are very low it may be that exporters pay
more than FDI firms. Although trade costs have been decreasing in the past decades,
recent empirical findings, such as Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels
and Schaur (2012), suggest that trade costs tend to be large even between highly
integrated economies. Large trade costs, in turn, imply small market access variables
for exporters (Υx), and hence, supports the notion that multinational wage premia
are larger.
As there is a common wage for all workers within the same firm, wage differences
between firms are driven by differences in the bargaining outcomes of firms with
their employees. Therefore, as in Helpman et al. (2017), this framework features
residual wage inequality in the sense that ex ante identical workers receive different
wages depending on whether they are matched with an exporter or non-exporter.
This is consistent with recent empirical evidence (e.g. Schank et al. (2007) and
Helpman et al. (2017)), exporters not only have higher revenue and employment
than firms that only operate in the domestic market, but also pay higher wages, as
implied by the market access variable Υx > 1. Additionally, my analysis features
a multinational wage premium as found by Heyman et al. (2007) and Martins (2011).
Outward vs Inward FDI
Equation (36) further highlights that foreign owned multinationals (inward FDI)
may pay different wages to domestically owned multinationals (outward FDI). For
example, if we consider two multinational firms with identical firm specific draws
(Z(z, d, e)), but that only differ with respect to their country of origin we can express
the difference in pay between these firms as follows
lnwH − lnw∗H = (µH − µ∗H) +
k
δΓ (ln Υ(Z)− ln Υ
∗(Z)) (2.37)
25Note that Υi > Υx is a necessary condition for FDI to exist in the model.
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where the remaining variables and parameters on the right hand side of this equa-
tion depend on the relative demand shifter (A∗/A) and the relative labour market
frictions (b/b∗). Whether inward or outward FDI firms pay more will, thus, depend
on which country has higher (lower) labour market frictions. I will discuss the im-
plications of labour market rigidities for wage inequality in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Comparative Statics
In the comparative static exercise conducted below, each country, home and foreign,
has labour market frictions of the type described in the previous section, with the
coefficients varying across countries (b, b∗). I will focus on a scenario where the home
country liberalises its labour market (lower b), implying a decrease in the relative
rigidities (b/b∗).
Furthermore, in the following I will focus on productivity heterogeneity (z) as the
only source of firm heterogeneity, implying that d = e = 1. This allows me to impose
a particular distribution for (z). More precisely, a firm’s productivity z is assumed
to be independently distributed and drawn from a Pareto distribution Gz = 1−z−ϕ,
for z > 0 and ϕ > 1.
Entry
Given that we now only have one source of heterogeneity and applying the pareto
distribution to equation (28) yields the following expression for the free entry con-
dition
25This assumption is standard in the literature on trade and firm heterogeneity and provides
a reasonable approximation for the observed distribution of firm sizes (e.g. Axtell (2001)), and
































)−(ϕ−βΓ) = zϕd fe (2.38)
where the ratios of the different cutoffs are given by (27)- (29), which depend on
the fixed costs of market entry and the market access variables for exporting and
FDI activity. I further make an assumption on the following parameters which is
maintained throughout.
Technical Assumption 3: ϕ >max {β/Γ, 1}
The market access variables, in turn, are a function of the relative labour mar-
ket friction (b/b∗) and the demand shifter (A∗/A). Using equation (27) and the












which is increasing in b∗/b and decreasing in z∗d/zd. The relative domestic cutoffs are
given by (39) and the equivalent expression for the foreign country.
Having defined the relative demand shifter, we can substitute this expression into
(21) to obtain the market access variable for exporters and FDI firms, which enables
us to study the effect of home’s labour market policy on firms’ exporting and FDI
decisions. In order to perform this comparative statics exercise, I will consider two
thought experiments. First, I will focus on the firms’ exporting decisions, without
FDI. Second, I allow for FDI, but no exporting to analyse the effect on FDI activity.
In doing so, we will be able to identify the implications of a more flexible labour
market (in the home country) for exporting and FDI choices separately.
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Effect on Exporting
Consider the case where exporting is the only mode of foreign market entry, i.e.
fi → ∞. Plugging (39) into (21) we can find an expression of the market access
variable for exporters as a function of the relative labour market friction and the
relative domestic cuttoff:
Υx ≡






This expression makes clear that the revenue premium for exporting is increasing
in the relative labour market friction b∗/b, which makes exporting more attractive.
From equation (28), a higher Υx implies a decrease in the relative cutoff zx/zd. In
other words, a more flexible labour market in the home country decreases the export
cutoff and increases the domestic cutoff. The opposite holds for the foreign country,
i.e. a higher b∗/b increases its export cutoff and lowers its domestic cutoff. This
result for the export cutoff is quite intuitive, as the labour cost advantage in the
home country allows firms to export profitably even with lower productivities. The
effect on the domestic cutoff (zd) comes from the fact that lower labour market
rigidities (b) increase expected profits from exporting at the entry stage, which have
to be offset with lower expected profits from domestic sales in order for the free entry
condition to be satisfied. In order to see this formally, we can find the domestic cutoff


























where I plugged in zx/zd from equation (28). As discussed above concerning equation
(41), a decrease in the home country’s labour market rigidity increases Υx and hence,
raises the domestic cutoff zd. Note that this, in turn, generates a positive feedback
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effect through a higher relative cutoff z∗d/zd, which tends to further increase Υx. By
applying the implicit function theorem to (41), it can be shown that a lower labour
market frictions in the home country implies a higher zero-profit cutoff zd.
This finding has important implications. A labour market reform in the home
country has a similar effect to asymmetric trade liberalisation. A more flexible labour
market increases a country’s competitiveness and implies a lower cutoff for exporting,
which induces within-industry reallocation of resources between firms. The least pro-
ductive firms exit with the increase in the domestic zero-profit cutoff zd, firms below
the new export cutoff contract and the most productive firms above zx(-new) expand.
Effect on FDI
Now consider the case where variable trade costs are prohibitively high, such that
firms only enter the foreign market via FDI activity, i.e. τ →∞. The market access
variable for exporters as a function of the relative labour market friction and the





Note that the the relative labour market rigidity, which was previously present in
(21), has now cancelled out. I will discuss the implications below.
Similar to the exporting-only case, we can find an expression for the domestic


























Equation (42), together with (43) clarify that in the case of FDI-only the market
access variable for FDI activity Υi, as well as the relative cutoff z∗d/zd remain unaf-
fected by a change in the relative labour market friction. Likewise, the relative FDI
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cutoff zi/zd does not change, and hence, the number of FDI firms remains constant.
At first glance this result may be surprising, as b∗/b does show up in the expression
for the market access variable in (21). The reason for the neutral effect of a change
in the relative labour market flexibility on cutoffs and the revenue premium is as
follows. The direct effect of a change in b∗/b tends to decrease Υi as a more flexible
labour market makes FDI activity less attractive for home country firms. However,
this effect is being offset by the indirect effect through the relative demand shifter
(A∗/A). From (39) it follows that the relative demand shifter is decreasing in b∗/b.
Intuitively, this indirect effect captures the fact that a more flexible labour market
acts like efficiency improvements in this country, which is in line with a fall in the
price index P in (34).
Importantly, although an improvement of the home country’s labour market in-
stitution is neutral with respect to cutoffs and the market access variable for FDI
activity, there may be welfare gains or losses. From the perspective of the home coun-
try, a lower aggregate Price index increases the household’s direct utility (see (12)).
In contrast, welfare in the foreign country falls due to a higher price in the economy.
Therefore, a labour market reform in a country can turn into a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy.
Lastly, it should be noted that by allowing for exporting and FDI activity si-
multaneously, the predictions concerning FDI may change. Changes in the relative
labour market frictions will then change the mix of exporting and FDI firms and
thus, alter the structure international activity.
2.4 Conclusion
Globalisation, has various faces. While, some firms choose to serve foreign markets
via exporting at arms length, other firms decide to ’go full in’ by selling through
25This is also true for the exporting-only case, which is in line with the implications of the trade
model by Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)
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foreign affiliates. The first chapter of my thesis provided empirical evidence for
the hypothesis that differences in firms’ mode of foreign market entry, have diverse
implications for labour market outcomes. In this paper, I build a theoretical model to
study the implications of these two distinct forms of globalisation on labour market
outcomes.
The analysis suggests that firms with superior average characteristics - in terms
of productivity, screening efficiency or fixed export or FDI cost - become exporters
and firms with an even higher firm specific triplet, serve foreign markets via FDI.
As in Helpman et al. (2017), the participation of some but not all firms in inter-
national activities provides a mechanism for heterogeneous forms of globalisation to
affect wage inequality. As wages and international activities are closely linked to
heterogeneous firm characteristics, exporting and FDI firms pay higher wages, and
multinationals can be ranked at the top of this wage hierarchy.
The comparative statics exercise in this paper pointed out that the interdepen-
dence between labour market rigidities and firm’s mode of foreign market entry, im-
plies that changes in a country’s labour market institution (such as a labour market
reform) changes the pattern of trade and FDI within and across countries. There-
fore, by adding multinational activity to the international trade analysis this paper
enriches our ability to understand how labour market reforms can condition the
relationship between diverse aspects of globalisation and labour market outcomes.
In summary, this paper provides a unified framework for analysing the complex
interplay between diverse forms of globalisation, labour market frictions and wage
inequality. In doing so I have built a theoretical model that is able to explain my
empirical findings from the first chapter of my thesis. The theory explains positive
exporter and multinational premia for employment and wages and predicts imperfect
correlations between firm employment, wages and international activity.
The analysis further highlights a number of interesting areas for further research.
Since some of the models predictions regarding wage inequality are ambiguous, a
calibration of the model would enable us to sign some of the effects described in
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the paper. Finally, I believe my framework has the potential to capture and explain
the interdependence between firms international activities, institutional changes and
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Coşar, A. K., N. Guner, and J. Tybout (2016). Firm dynamics, job turnover, and
wage distributions in an open economy. American Economic Review 106 (3), 625–
63.
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Accounting for Skill Premia across
Countries and Time
3.1 Introduction
Applying the basic economic principle of supply and demand in order to understand
changes in the relative wage of skilled workers (skill-premium), predicts that an
increase in the relative supply of skills ought to decrease the premium the labour
market pays for skills. A closer look at recent developments of the skill premium in
several countries, however, suggests that for some countries exactly the opposite is
true.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the log change in the skill premium
and the log change in the share of individuals with completed tertiary education
(skill ratio) for a sample of 36 countries between 1983 and 2007.1 Clearly, despite
the large increase in the share of educated people in most countries, the skill premium
1The skill premium is defined as the ratio of the mean wage in a set of manufacturing occupations
that are classified as high-skilled by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-
88), to the mean wage in a set of low-skilled occupations. The growth in the skill premium is
calculated by calculating the relative change of two subperiods. I take 8-year averages, which
defines the first (1983-1991) and the last subperiod (1999-2007), respectively.
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has failed to decrease during the same period.
Notes: The figure shows the correlation between the log change in the relative skill supply and log
changes in the skill premium. The regression coefficient is 0.01 (robust SE: 0.036), p-value of
0.807 and with R2 of 0.001. Data are for a balanced panel of 36 countries in 8 year intervals
between 1983-1991 and and 1999-2007. See section 3.1 for a detailed description of data sources.
Figure 3.1: Relative changes in skill-supply and the skill-premium (1983-2007)
This puzzling observation calls for a closer investigation of the key factors shaping
the evolution of the skill-premium across countries and time. I use the structure of a
two-sector two-factor model to attribute changes in the skill premium across countries
to three potential sources: (i) changes in the relative abundance of skilled workers,
(ii) technological change and (iii) market size effects due to external economies of
scale. In this model the production of final goods uses low and high-skilled labour,
and a continuum of different varieties of intermediate inputs. Due to increasing
returns to scale in the underlying production function, the model exhibits additional
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market size effects, which are the source of the latter of the three effects.
I employ the development and growth accounting methodology as an analytic tool
to assess the relative importance of each one of these channels in explaining cross-
country skill premium changes.2 In the context of the skill-premium analysis, I am
asking the analogous question of how much of the variation in changes skill premium
over time, can be explained by variations in the growth of countries’ relative skill-
supply and how much of cross-country skill-premium variation remains unexplained.
Consequently, the unexplained fraction of the skill-premium must be attributed to
technological change. My findings add to the growing evidence that there is hardly
any association between changes in the relative supply of skills and the observed
evolution of the skill-premium.
The most important results in this paper concern the relationship between mar-
ket size effects and the observed patterns in the data. I show that the measure of the
importance of market size effects governs the strength of the relationship between
technological change and the skill-premium, where larger values of the importance
of market size effects improve the goodness of fit substantially. Moreover, for strong
enough economies of scale, an increase in the share of high-skilled workers increases
the the skill premium. This observation may provide a potential explanation for the
pattern of skill premia across countries and time, where skill premia were increasing
despite the simultaneous rise in the relative supply of skills. Importantly, this finding
points out that the scale of the economy may be an important factor in shaping de-
velopments of the skill premium, independent of the specific features of technological
2In the context of income differences across countries, development accounting assesses the
relative contribution of differences in factor quantities, and differences in the efficiency with which
those factors are used, to cross-country differences in per-worker incomes. Equivalently, growth
accounting, as first implemented by Solow (1957), examines the different aspects of growth to
determine which factor most likely created the increase in per-worker income. The development
accounting literature usually refers to the unexplained variation of growth as technological progress,




This paper contributes to the large literature studying different determinants of
wage inequality across countries and time. In particular, my analysis relates to a
number of papers trying to explain the puzzling patterns between the increase in the
skill premium and the simultaneous rise in the relative supply of skills across many
countries. The main factors identified by the literature are skill-biased technological
change and international trade.3
A paper that is particularly related to my analysis is Caselli and Coleman (2006).
They perform a development accounting exercise to study cross country income and
technology differences. They use information on the relative skill supply and data
on the skill premium to back out the values for the high and low-skilled augment-
ing productivities.4 Hence, they report cross-country skill premium differences and
analyse the resulting implications for technological change in the presence of barriers
to technological adoption. While Caselli and Coleman (2006) study cross-sectional
differences, my paper focuses on changes over time. Moreover, I analyse the role of
market size effects, which is absent from their accounting exercise.
Another paper that is closely related in terms of the overall question is Acemoglu
(2003), who analyses how skill premia differ over time and across countries. However,
his paper is different in several ways. First, his paper is a purely theoretical contri-
bution and second, in the model he develops, skill premia are not only determined by
the relative supply of skills, but also by endogenous technological change and trade.
In doing so, he focuses on different channels in explaining developments of the skill
3For example Acemoglu (1998) Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) Acemoglu (2002), Card and Di-
Nardo (2002) and Gasparini et al. (2011) focus on skill-biased technological as the main determinant
of inequality.
4Furthermore, the implied methodology relies on the fact that wages are informative about
relative marginal productivities, which may not be the case given the large discrepancies in labour
market institutions across countries.
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premium. The most important result of his paper is that increased international
trade induces skill-biased technical change. As a result, trade opening can cause a
rise in inequality both in developed and the less developed countries.
Lastly, my paper relates to previous contributions studying the skill bias of scale,
as proposed by Epifani and Gancia (2006) and Epifani and Gancia (2008). They
show that the increase in market size can lead to higher skill premia and income
inequality. Similar to the framework employed for my analysis, their mechanism is
based on a two-sector, two-factor model. However, they assume that the more skill
intensive sector exhibits stronger returns to scale. They show that an increase in the
market size through trade increases the relative wage of skilled workers, as output
increases relatively more in the skill-intensive sectors due to stronger economies of
scale.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I preset the model, which
serves as the basis of the skill-premium accounting exercise. Section 3 provides a
description of the data and presents the results of the accounting exercise. In section
4 I discuss the implications of my findings, and section 5 concludes the paper.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setup
This section outlines a basic two-factor two-sector model that captures the approx-
imate determinants of the skill premium. The framework is a based on a standard
Dxit-Stiglitz formulation for a closed economy.
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Preferences
Consumers have preferences represented by a utility function which is defined over














where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the two final goods. CLt and
CHt stand for the consumption of the low-and high-skill intensive good in year t.
Furthermore, σi is a parameter capturing the relative importance in consumption of
the i -intensive good (i ∈ L,H) , where σL + σH = 1.
Technologies and Market Structure
Production of final goods uses low (Lit) and high-skilled labour (Hit), and a con-
tinuum of different varieties of intermediate inputs indexed by m ∈ [0,Mit], with
Mit being the aggregate measure of input varieties. The production technology of
industry i can be summarized by the total cost function Bit of producing Qti fi-
nal good and the cost function bit(m) of producing qit(m) units of variety m of the






























where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 captures the relative importance of intermediate inputs in the
production of sector i , 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 is the share of skilled workers employed in
industry i, ε > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between input varieties and
Zit is an exogenous industry-productivity measure. In the following we will assume
that αH > αL, i.e. that industry i = H is skill-intensive relative to industry i = L.
With perfectly mobile labour the competitive wage workers receive is denoted by wit.
Equation (2) states that the technology to produce the final good of industry i is
a Cobb-Douglas function on low and high-skilled workers, and intermediate inputs.
Equation (3) implies that the production technology of intermediate inputs is also a
Cobb-Douglas function on the two different types of workers and that there are fixed
and variable costs.
The labour market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The market for the final
goods Qit operates under perfect competition, whereas the market for intermediate
inputs exhibits monopolistic competition.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Prices
The production function of final goods in equation (2) exhibits constant returns.






Moreover, the representative household’s utility maximisation from equation (1) im-
plies the following relationship between the relative price and the relative inverse
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Choosing the final output as the numeraire, the price index P in the economy for a





Lt + (1− σL)θP 1−θHt
] 1
1−θ = 1 (3.6)
Intermediate goods producers are assumed to operate under monopolistic compe-
tition with free entry. This implies that the profit maximising price is being set










Market clearing conditions for the goods and labour market by the following set of
equations:
PitQit = Eit (3.8)
which states that the aggregate supply of each good matches its demand, where
Eit = PitCit is the aggregate expenditure on the i-intensive good . The expression
for aggregate demand of low- (Lt) and high-skilled (Ht) are given by
Lt =
∑






Hit with Htit = HQit +H
q
it (3.10)
where Lit and Hit are the number of low and high-skilled workers demanded by
industry i. Furthermore, low- and high-skilled workers producing the final good in
industry i can be denoted as LQit and workers engaged in the production of intermedi-




it, represent the number of high-skilled workers
engaged in producing final goods and intermediate goods respectively. Equations (9)
and (10) imply that aggregate supply of high and low-skilled labour must equal their
demands.









where µ = 1 + β/ (ε− 1). It is clear to see that the production function in (11)
exhibits increasing returns to scale if the parameter µ > 1; i.e. an increase in the
available number of varieties Mit, through an increase in the market size, increases
output over proportionally. Thus, µ can be interpreted as a measure of the impor-
tance of market size effects. Intuitively, this implies that a larger market benefits
from external economies of scale as they tend to have a larger number of varieties
of goods and inputs available.6 The following section determines the equilibrium
skill-premium with (µ > 1) and without (µ = 1) market size effects. In doing so,
5See Appendix for the derivation of equation (11).
6Note, that economies of scale effects only depend on ε and do not directly come from the
presence of fixed costs at the firm level. Epafani & Gancia (2006, 2008) show that ’external
economies of scale’ (from the firm perspective) are a good proxy for the latter. Especially Epifani
and Gancia (2006), review evidence showing that high-skilled workers, in any country, are employed
in sectors where plant-level fixed costs are high, and produce highly differentiated goods that are
gross substitutes for less-skill-intensive products. Given these findings, their theory implies that
scale is skill-biased, thereby providing a micro foundation for the perpetual increase in the relative
demand for skilled workers.
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we will be able to identify to what extent market size effects play a role in shaping
skill-premium differences across countries and time.
Skill Premium
Defining the wage rate for skilled labour as wHt and wLt as the wage rate for unskilled
labour in a frictionless labour market, the relative wage of high skilled workers can
be expressed by using the relative price from equation (4) and relative demand of
a good from equation (10). Hence, the above system (1)-(10) implies the following


























. Next, solving for the equi-












 (1− αL)HtLt wHtwLt − αL







where ψi = σθ/(θ−1)µi (1−αi)(1−αi)ααii . Equations (12) and (13) highlight three poten-
tial channels through which the skill-premium can be affected: changes in relative
industry productivities ZHt/ZLt, the share of skilled workers Ht/Lt, and an increase
in the market sizes, captured by MHt and MLt. Equation (13) implies that ceteris
paribus the skill-premium is decreasing in the relative supply of skills Ht/Lt, as long
as (θ−1)µ−θ
θ
< 0. In other words, in order for the skill premium and relative skill
supply to be inversely correlated, it has to be true that µ < θ(θ−1) . Moreover, for
7See Appendix for the derivation of equation (13).
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a given supply of skills the skill-premium also depends on relative industry produc-
tivities ZHt/ZLt and hence, an increase in the relative industry specific efficiency
with which labour is used, tends to increase the relative wage of high skilled work-
ers. For simplicity, I subsequently assume that the high-skill intensive industry uses
only high-skilled workers and the low-skill intensive industry only low-skilled workers
respectively (i.e. αH = 1 and αL = 0).
3.2.3 Special Cases
Special Case: No market size effects (µ = 1)
In order to understand the importance of the measure of market size effects µ in
shaping skill-premium developments, I first consider the special case where µ = 1,
i.e. market size effects are entirely absent. Under the above mentioned condition,
i.e. αH = 1 and αL = 0, we can find an explicit expression of the skill-premium
in terms of relative industry productivities ZHt/ZLt and relative factor endowments





























Concerning this equation, two observations stand out: First, the inverse of the elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption θ can now be interpreted as the elasticity of the
skill-premium with respect to the relative supply of skills.8 Second, the simplified
formulation in equation (14) suggests that the relative importance in consumption
of high-skill intensive goods in the economy may be another important factor in
determining the skill-premium; i.e. a rise in the importance in consumption of the
8The special feature of this kind of specific-factor model is that, the elasticity of substitution in
consumption also coincides with the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers.
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high-skill intensive good σH causes the skill-premium to increase. Intuitively, this
means that the demand for skilled workers increases the higher its relative demand
within the economy, resulting in higher relative wages for skilled workers. As in equa-
tion (13) the positive relationship between the relative wage of high skilled workers
and relative industry productivities remains.
General Case: The role of market size effects (µ > 1)
Next, we turn to the more general case, where market size effects, through µ > 1,
are present. As in the special case without market size effects, we here assume that




























This equation makes clear that introducing market size effects (µ > 1) reduces the
responsiveness of the skill-premium to changes in the supply of high-skilled workers.
As pointed out in the special case without market size effects, an increase in the
relative supply of skills lowers relative wages with elasticity 1/θ. Hence in the more
general case with µ > 1 the elasticity is given by
∂ln(wH/wL)
∂ln(H/L) =
(θ − 1)µ− θ
θ
(3.16)
Therefore, for a given level of RTFP the implied relative demand curve for high vs
low skilled workers is downward sloping if the elasticity implied by (16) is negative.
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3.3 Accounting for Skill-Premium Changes
This section is about determining and quantifying to what extent the individual
channels, i.e. changes in the relative scarcity of high-skilled workers and relative
industry productivities, contribute to changes in the skill-premium across countries.
Furthermore, I will explore the way market size effects play a role in shaping the
observed results. This accounting exercise is very similar to the one in the develop-
ment and growth accounting literature. Development accounting assesses the relative
contribution of differences in factor quantities, and differences in the efficiency with
which those factors are used, to cross-country differences in per-worker incomes.
Equivalently, growth accounting allows one to examine the different aspects of
growth to determine which factor most likely created the increase in per-worker in-
come. Using the growth accounting methodology in the context of the skill-premium
analysis is a powerful tool that enables us to identify the proximate sources of changes
in the skill-premium. In other words, I am asking the question of how much of the
variation in changes in the skill premium over time, can be explained by variations
in the growth of countries’ relative skill-supply and how much of cross-country skill-
premium variation remains unexplained. Consequently, the unexplained fraction of
the skill-premium must be attributed to changes in relative industry productivities.
Given the simplified framework, as in equation (14) and (15), this residual variation,
also called the ’measure of ignorance’ (see Caselli (2005)), may not only capture
differences in efficiencies with which labour is used, but also other omitted factors,
such as changes in the demand for skills.
The following section is structured as follows: first, I will present the data sources
and parametrisation strategy of this accounting exercise and second, I will implement
the accounting exercise (i) without market size effects (µ = 1) and (ii) in the presence
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of market size effects (µ > 1).
3.3.1 Data Sources
In order to perform the accounting exercise we need data on the skill premium
(wH/wL) and the relative supply of skills (H/L), as well as calibrated values for the
elasticity of substitution in demand (θ) and the importance of market size effects
(µ), which is central to my accounting exercise.
Skill Premium
The empirical counterpart of the skill premium (wH/wL) can be constructed by us-
ing wage data for different occupations, where the skill-premium can be defined as
the ratio of the mean wage in a set of high-skill to low-skill occupations. The occu-
pational wage data come from the updated Occupational Wages Around the World
(OWW) database by Freeman and Oostendorp (2005), which contains occupational
wages for 161 occupations in 171 countries from 1983 until 2008. The data for their
study were derived from the ILO October Inquiry, which collects information on pay
(wages, earnings, and hours of work) across detailed occupations at the four-digit In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO88) level. The scope of the
ILO October Inquiry has been increasing since its inception in 1924, both in country
coverage and in number of occupations included. So far, the ILO October Inquiry
is the most far-ranging survey of wages by occupations around the world. However,
due to the lack of comparability in reported wage formats across countries and over
time, the ILO dataset is not directly usable. Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) con-
structed the OWW database by standardising data derived from the ILO October
Inquire database, such that wages could be made comparable across occupations,
countries and over time.9
9Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) use several different ways to impute the occupational wage
data, but the occupational wages from the different approaches are highly correlated. The present
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However, the data is very unbalanced in that countries rarely report wages for all
occupations in all years, which limits the size of my sample to 36 countries. More-
over, it should be noted that, although OWW represents a significant improvement
in standardising the data, Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) rely to a high degree on
data correction, calibration and imputation to standardise the occupational wage
data from the ILO datset. For example, some countries report more than one wage
for a single occupation, others give wages for one gender only, or only for the dom-
inant economic region. Another issue is the fact that countries report wages in
different formats, i.e. either hourly, monthly or some only report minimum wages.
Relative Skill Supply
A variable that has played a prominent role in the development-accounting literature
and which I am going to employ for the same purpose, is the measure of relative skill
supply from the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset of educational attainment in the world.
The Barro and Lee (2013) database provides educational attainment data for 146
countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. Their key sources of raw data to build
measures of skilled and unskilled labor supply come from census/survey information,
as compiled by UNESCO, Eurostat, and other sources. The census/survey figures
report the distribution of educational attainment in the population over age 15 by
sex and by 5-year age group, for most cases, in seven categories: (1) no formal
education, (2) incomplete primary, (3) complete primary, (4)lower secondary, (5)
upper secondary, (6) incomplete and (7) complete tertiary.
study employs their occupation wages in U.S. dollars with country-specific and uniform calibration,
type 3, lexicographic weighting (x3wlus in their data set). See Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) for
a detailed description of how the OWW data file is being constructed.
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3.3.2 Data Description and Parameters
Data
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for wH/wL
Subsample Obs Min Mean Max Std. Dev.
1983-1991 36 0.77 1.53 2.82 0.47
1999-2007 36 0.78 1.77 3.85 0.66
d(wH/wL)
wH/wL
36 -0.41 0.17 0.86 0.26
I use the provided hourly wages from the updated OWW dataset to calculate the skill
premium as the ratio of the mean wage in a set of manufacturing occupations that are
classified as high-skilled by the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-88), to the mean wage in a set of low-skilled occupations. Further, I divide
the sample into two periods; i.e t = 1, 2: first, the average skill premium in the first 8
years (wH1/wL1) (i.e. 1983-1991) and second, the respective value in the last 8 years
(wH2/wL2)(1999-2007). In using 8 year averages I am able to control and smooth
out (at least to some extent) potential measurement errors, outliers in a particular
year and common macro changes. The choice of countries is mainly dictated by
the availability of data. More specifically, the countries selected for the sample are
those, where the average manufacturing skill premium and the relative supply of
skilled workers exist for the first and last 8 years of the sample. This leaves us with
36 countries in total.10
Furthermore, I choose the relative supply of high-skilled workers, to match the
share of tertiary schooling attained in the population (i.e. university graduates with
degrees and post-graduates) from the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. Table 1 dis-
10See Appendix for the list of countries in the sample.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for H/(H + L)
Subsample Obs Min Mean Max Std. Dev. Corr wH/wL
1983-1991 36 0.008 0.06 0.23 4,93 -0.24
1999-2007 36 0.001 0.10 0.25 7.12 -0.21
d(H/(H+L)
H/(H+L) 36 -0.87 0.74 2.62 0.68 0.04
plays the summary statistics for wH/wL and Table 2 for H/(H + L) respectively.
Moreover, Figure 1 depicts the relationship between relative changes in skill premia
and the relative supply of skills.
Paramatrisation
In the baseline version, the skill intensity in the high-skill intensive sector is given
by αH = 1, and in the low-skill intensive sector by αL = 0 respectively.
For the elasticity of substitution between input varieties (ε), I use the median
value estimated by Feenstra and Romalis (2014), which is set at 6.07. Epifani and
Gancia (2008) use a similar model specification based on a two sector - two factor
framework as the one I employ and provide estimates for the elasticity of substitution
in demand (θ) between 1-2. Thus, here I choose the average value of θ = 1.5.
Lastly, the measure of importance of market size effects (µ) is taken from Broda
et al. (2006), who estimate the impact of new varieties on GDP using highly disag-
gregated trade data. They find that a one percent increase in the number of varieties
raises GDP by 0.14 percent. This estimate implies that here µ = 1.14
Table 3 summarises data sources and the parametrisation strategy.
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Table 3.3: Data and Paramatrisation Strategy
Data & Parameters Value Description Source
wH/wL data Skill-Premium Freeman and Oostendorp (2005)
H/(H + L) data Relative supply of skilled workers Barro and Lee (2013)
θ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution in demand Epifani and Gancia (2008)
µ 1.14 Importance of market sizes effects Broda et al. (2006)
αH 1 Share of high-skilled workers -
in the high skill-intensive industry
αL 0 Share of high-skilled workers -
in the low skill-intensive industry
3.3.3 Accounting Methodology
In order to perform an equivalent growth accounting exercise of the skill premium,
















where a ’hat’ above the different terms indicates relative changes; i.e. ˆ(wH/wL) =
∆(wH/wL)
(wH/wL) ,
ˆ(H/L) = ∆(H/L)(H/L) and ˆ(ZH/ZL) =
∆(ZH/ZL)
(ZH/ZL) . Equation (16) further implies
that the unobservable term ˆ(ZH/ZL) can be inferred from the data on the observable
variables; namely (i) the relative change in the skill-premium ˆ(wH/wL) and (ii) the
relative change in the supply of high-skilled workers ˆ(H/L).
Rearranging equation (17) for ˆ(ZH/ZL) yields the following expression for the
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Hence, changes in RTFP are entirely pinned down by equation (18), implying that
ˆ(ZH/ZL) is chosen to fit the theoretical relationship between the observed relative
changes in the skill-premium and changes in the relative skill supply.
Next, I define the known term in equation (15) as ˆ(wH/wL)
S
= −((θ − 1)µ −
θ)/θ) ˆ(H/L), and
ˆ̂ S
(ZH/ZL) = ((θ − 1)µ/θ) ˆ(ZH/ZL), which I will refer to as the













Based on this equation I can pursue the following skill-premium accounting question:
How successful is the ’skill-supply model’ in explaining the observed growth of skill-
premium across countries? To perform this assessment I will look at a simple variance





















A look at this equation makes clear that if more of the cross-country variation in
changes of the skill-premium have to be attributed to changes in RTFP, less of the
variation in ˆ(wH/wL) can be explained by variations in changes of countries’ relative
skill-supply. this in turn, implies that much of the skill-premium changes are due
to other omitted factors, such as changes in efficiencies with which labour is used
or changes in the demand for skilled workers. Hence, the share of cross-country
variation in ˆ(wH/wL) which must be attributed to the variation in the backed out
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A perfect match between theory and data would be depicted by a measure of igno-
rance equal to 0.11
3.3.4 Accounting with µ = 1
Table 4 presents the results of this skill-premium accounting assessment for the
special case of no market size effects (µ = 1), confirming what the summary statistics
in Tables 1 and 2 jointly point out: despite the fact that the relative supply of
skills has increased markedly in the last decades, the skill-premium has failed to
decline during the same period. This finding has important implications: changes
of the relative supply of skill do not seem to adequately capture changes in the
skill-premium across countries.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for changes in RTFP (µ = 1)
Obs Min Mean Max Var ignorance
Full Sample 36 -1.28 1.99 6.27 2.59 38.08
High-Income Countries 12 -0.03 1.64 4.23 1.98 61.88
Low-Income Countries 24 -1.28 2.12 6.27 2.90 40.81
As the figures in Table 4 suggest, the missing link here is technological change,
i.e. changes of the skill-premium across countries have to be attributed to changes
in RTFP. While the observed variance of the relative change in the skill premium is
11Alternatively, we could assess this skill premium-accounting exercise by looking at the measure
of success as in Caselli (2005), which compares the variation in changes in the supply of skills to
the cross-country variation in the relative change of the skill-premium.
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small, the heterogeneity in ˆ(ZH/ZL), according to this accounting exercise, is very
large. This explains the relatively large value for the measure of ignorance, which
is equal to 38.08 for the special case of no market size effects. We can therefore
conclude that a simple framework that only incorporates the supply side of skills,
does not adequately capture changes in the skill-premium across countries.
Having a closer look at the bottom two rows of Table 4, reveals that although the
implied variation in RTFP is larger in low-income countries, the measure of ignorance
is greater for high-income countries. This, in turn, implies that the observed hetero-
geneity in skill premia among high-income countries is smaller than the analogous
variation among low-income countries. The smaller value of for low-income coun-
tries implies that the skill-supply model does a better job in explaining cross-country
changes of the skill premium for this subsample than for high-income countries.
Moreover, the positive mean change in RTFP, suggests that technological change
in the high-skill intensive industry is on average larger than in the low skill-intensive
industry. This observation is in line with Kahn and Lim (1998), who find strong
evidence that productivity growth was increasingly concentrated in the more skill-
intensive manufacturing industries.12
3.3.5 Accounting with µ > 1
Table 5 presents the analogous accounting exercise for the case with market size
effects (µ > 1). Given the parameter values according to the paramatrisation strat-
egy as described in section 3.2, the value of the measure of market size effects takes
1.14. The summary statistics for the implied relative changes in RTFP are depicted
12Haskel and Slaughter (2002) provide a theoretical framework for this so called ’sector bias’ of
technological change. The intuition behind sector bias relies on changes in the relative profitability
of sectors. Any sector-specific technological change makes that sector profitable at fixed product
prices and initial factor prices. Given fixed labour supply, relative wages adjust until the profit
opportunities are arbitraged away.
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in Table 5. Similar to the special case with µ = 1, the cross-country heterogeneity
in changes in RTFP are large: the values range between -1.03 and 5.24 and the
necessary mean increase in RTFP takes a value of 1.68. Furthermore, Table 5 sug-
gests that in the presence of market size effects, the necessary variation in changes
in RTFP is now slightly lower. This finding is in line with the discussion related to





becomes less responsive to changes
in the relative scarcity of skills. Consequently, by increasing µ from 1.0 to 1.14, less
variation in technological change is required to capture the observed cross-country
skill-premium changes in the data, represented by a lower level of ignorance = 27.02.
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for changes in RTFP for µ = 1.14
Obs Min Mean Max Var ignorance
Full Sample 36 -1.03 1.68 5.24 1.84 27.02
High-Income Countries 12 -0.04 1.36 3.52 1.40 43.75
Low-Income Countries 24 -1.03 1.84 5.24 2.05 28.87
The results so far confirm what Figure 1 already suggested: There is hardly any
association between changes in the skill premium and changes in the relative supply of
skills. This finding is in particular true for high-income countries, as suggested by the
relatively larger values for the measure of ignorance. Moreover, introducing market
size effects, i.e. µ > 1, reduces the need for changes in RTFP to explain the data.
In the next section I will further explore the relationship between this parameter




3.4.1 Market size effects and the measure of ignorance
The skill premium accounting exercise in the previous section was performed for two
specific values of µ, i.e. µ = 1.0 and µ = 1.14. In this section I assess the model-fit
for different values µ. The relationship between the measure of ignorance and the
measure of the importance market size effects is summarised in Figure 2 and Table 6.
The Figure confirms the above finding: the higher the value for µ the lower the level
of ignorance, where the vertical dotted line depicts µ = 1.14, which is the value for
µ given the parameters as outlined in the parametrisation strategy. As the measure
of ignorance is highest in the polar case (µ = 1.0), the model with no market size
effects can be regarded as the lower bound (see Table 6).
Figure 3.2: The measure of ignorance and the importance of market size effects (µ)
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The results have important implications. For a given elasticity of substitution
between high - and low-skilled workers (θ), a higher value of µ implies that less of
a change in RTFP is required to explain the observed changes in the skill premium.
Looking at equation (17), it becomes clear why this is the case: Changes in µ imply
that the skill premium becomes less sensitive to changes in the relative supply of
skills.
The results above were driven by the fact that - given the implied value of µ - the
relationship between ˆ(wH/wL) and ˆ(H/L) in the data is weaker than the relationhip
implied by the model. In order to reconcile the changes observed in the data with
the ’skill-supply model’, countries with a large increase in the share of high-skilled
workers must also have a large increase in RTFP. Therefore, with higher values of µ
the skill premium becomes less responsive to changes in the relative supply of skills
and thus, closer to the empirical one. This in turn explains the negative relationship
between the measure of ignorance and the parameter µ.
Table 3.6: ignorance and the importance of market size effects (µ)
µ = 1.0 µ = 1.14 µ = 1.5 µ = 2.0 µ = 2.5 µ = 3.0 µ = 3.5
ignorance 38.08 27.02 11.38 4.15 1.77 1.00 0.85
Furthermore, for large enough values of µ, an increase in the share of high-skilled
workers increases the the skill premium. Taking into consideration the expression
for the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to the relative supply of skills in
(16), clarifies that for µ ≥ θ/(θ − 1) the negative relationship between relative skill
supply and the skill premium no longer holds. This observation provides a potential
explanation for the pattern of skill premia across countries and time, where skill
premia were increasing despite the simultaneous rise in the relative supply of skills.
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3.4.2 Interpretation and Implications
The analysis above highlights that market size effects govern the strength of the
relationship between technological change and the skill-premium. My findings sug-
gest that the larger the market size effect the less we need technological change in
order to explain patterns in the data, i.e. a higher value for µ implies lower levels of
ignorance. However, reasonable estimates of market size effects (1.14) are not large
enough to explain the observed skill premium patterns in the data.
The lower bound for µ is equal to one, which represents the case where the economy
operates under constant returns to scale. In the model this is captured by setting
β = 0, which implies that we exclude intermediate inputs in the production process
and hence, shut down the source for market size effects. As discussed above, µ = 1.0
the highest level of ignorance.
Table 6 presented different levels of the measure of ignorance for varying degrees of
market size effects. The question, however, arises what the upper bound on µ ought
to be. Suppose β = 1, which represents a model of full monopolistic competition á la
Krugman (1980, 1991). Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between varieties
suggest an average value of about ε = 6 (i.e. µ = 1.2) and the lower range lies
at about ε = 2, implying µ = 2. The measure of ignorance, in turn, then takes a
value of 4.12, which is still relatively large. 13 Hence, even for the upper bound of
plausible values for µ, technological change would have to explain the major share
of variation in skill premia across countries and time. Consequently, for plausible
parameterisations, market size effects can help to explain the observed patterns in
the data. However, overall technological change is the main factor.
13See for example Feenstra (1994), Morrison Paul and Siegel (1999) and Broda et al. (2006) for
studies which provide estimates for the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper I shed some light on the proximate determinants of changes in the
skill-premium. My findings add to the growing evidence that there is hardly any
association between changes in the relative supply of skills and the observed evolution
of the skill-premium. Furthermore, I show that the measure of the importance of
market size effects governs the strength of the relationship between technological
change and the skill-premium. Moreover, for strong enough economies of scale, an
increase in the relative supply of skills increases the the skill premium. Importantly,
this finding points out that the scale of the economy may be an important factor in
shaping developments of the skill premium, independent of the specific features of
technological change.
A central parameter in the analysis of this paper is the measure of the importance
of market size effects, which more generally captures the presence of economies of
scale in the economy. The analysis has shown that even for the upper bound of
plausible market size effects, technological change plays the main role in explaining
the observed skill premium patterns. Potentially, market size effects play a greater
role if economies of scale and innovation are linked. Studies analysing the impli-
cations of endogenous technological change have suggested that the R&D process
of innovating new varieties is subject to economies of scale. This indicates a close
link between market size effects and the nature of technological change and together
points towards theories of technological change. To the extent that economies of
scale are an important factor in shaping technological change, the channel identified
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A.1 Background and Data Description
LIAB Data
Data Access
This study uses the Linked-Employer-Employee Data (LIAB) cross-sectional model
2 1993-2014 (LIAB QM2 9314), provided by the German Institute for Employment
Research (IAB). Data access was provided via on-site use at the UK Data Archive
at the University of Essex and subsequently remote data access.
Complexity of tasks performed
Occupations can be described on the basis of the requirement level. The objective
of classifying occupations according to their complexity is to be able to depict the
various degrees of complexity within those occupations which have a high similarity
of occupational expertise. Four Requirement Levels are distinguished to map the
degree of complexity of an occupation. The assumption behind it is that a cer-
tain standard of skills, abilities and knowledge must exist for practicing a certain
occupation. The standard of skills, abilities and knowledge required for practicing
an occupation need not be based on the educational level, but can also be acquired
through work experience and learning-by-doing. Here, the formal qualification of the
person practicing the occupation is irrelevant; the subject of consideration is rather
the Requirement Level that is typically demanded for this occupational activity.14
14For further information see ?.
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Definition
According to international standards, FDI refers to cross-border investments made
by residents and businesses from one country into another, with the aim of establish-
ing a lasting investment in the company receiving investment.The “lasting interest”
is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the
direct investment enterprise.15 Furthermore, one can distinguish between inward and
outward FDI: The outward FDI stock is the value of the resident investors’ equity in
and net loans to enterprises in foreign economies. The inward FDI stock is the value
of foreign investors’ equity in and net loans to enterprises resident in the reporting
economy.
German FDI
Germany is one of the main recipients and source countries of FDI in the world,
where it is ranked 4th in terms of outward FDI and 6th with respect to inward FDI
stocks in 2017 (see ?). Outward investment (46% of GDP in 2017) by German resi-
dents tends to be much larger than inward FDI (26% of GDP in 2017). Furthermore,
FDI stock statistics, published by the Deutsche Bundesbank, show that more than
half of Germany’s inward FDI originates from within the EU. In contrast, the main
recipients of German outward FDI are invested in non-EU countries.16
15The ’OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th edition’, ?, provides oper-
ational guidelines on how foreign direct investment activity should be measured and sets the world
standard for collecting direct investment statistics.
16It is important to additionally record secondary investment via dependent holding companies
when analysing the main trends in cross-border investment. Consequently, FDI data usually refers
to the consolidated sum of primary FDI and secondary FDI (held through dependent holding




This part of the Appendix contain the relevant tables for the robustness checks in
section 3.3.
Table A.1: Robustness 1 - Unravelling the different Wage Premia (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls +Size +Industry +Occ +obs
Exporter 0.216*** 0.110*** 0.0412* 0.00305*** 0.0316***
(0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00148) (0.00127) (0.00116)
MNEFor 0.250*** 0.177*** 0.110*** 0.103*** 0.0846***
(0.00231) (0.00222) (0.00219) (0.00187) (0.00158)
MNEDom 0.172*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.0209*** 0.0372***
(0.00611) (0.00573) (0.00574) (0.00489) (0.00428)
MNEHyb 0.324*** 0.186*** 0.156*** 0.0645*** 0.0624***
(0.00346) (0.00333) (0.00326) (0.00138) (0.00116)
Observations 332,645 332,645 332,645 332,645 332,645
Firms 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779
R2 0.035 0.158 0.188 0.430 0.565
Notes: This Table presents estimation results equivalent to the ones in Table 3, where here
workers are included that may only appear in the sample in 2006. The sample corresponds
to full-time workers between 16 and 65 years of age, where data is available in 2006. De-
pendent variable is the log daily wage. Firm variables include the firm type (local, exporter
and 3 different MNEs), the log of employment (size) and 17 industry catagories. Worker
observables include: gender, age, nationality (dummy for foreign), tenure at the firm, 340
different occupations and the educational level. The education groups are defined as: 1)
low: no vocational training, no high-school; 2) medium: high school and/or vocational
training; 3) high: university or technical college. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance at: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table A.2: Robustness 2 - Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity





log size 0.0776*** 0.0332*** 0.0463*** 0.0259***




Time FE x x x x
Worker controls x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Observations 425,323 425,323 425,323 425,323
Firms 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774
R2 0.541 0.545 0.434 0.547
Notes: The Table presents estimation results equivalent to the ones in Table
4, but I now exclude all firms that change their type between 2006 and 2010.
The sample corresponds to full-time workers between 16 and 65 years of age,
where data is available in both sample periods. Dependent variable is the log
daily wage. Firm variables include the firm type (local, exporter and 3 differ-
ent MNEs), the log of employment (size) and 17 industry catagories. Worker
observables include: gender, age, nationality (dummy for foreign), tenure at
the firm, 340 different occupations and the educational level. The educa-
tion groups are defined as: 1) low: no vocational training, no high-school; 2)
medium: high school and/or vocational training; 3) high: university or tech-
nical college. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance
at: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table A.3: Robustness 3 - Firm Movers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter 0.0299*** 0.0206*** 0.0259*** 0.0191***
(0.00112) (0.000958) (0.00165) (0.000932)
MNE 0.0492*** 0.0269*** 0.0164*** 0.0250***
(0.000932) (0.00104) (0.00181) (0.00102)
log size 0.0691*** 0.0332*** 0.0488*** 0.0259***






Time FE x x x x
Worker controls x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Observations 665290 665290 665290 665290
Firms 5,490 5,490 5,490 5,490
R2 0.430 0.574 0.457 0.579
Notes: This Table presents estimation results equivalent to the ones in Table 4,
additionally including a dummy variable for whether a worker transitions to a
different firm between 2006 and 2010. Regressions based on LIAB data for the
year 2006 and 2010. The sample corresponds to full-time workers between 16
and 65 years of age, where data is available in both sample periods. Dependent
variable is the log daily wage. See notes of table 3 for the set of firm and worker
observables. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at:




I follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and assume that wages are determined by contin-
uous bargaining between the firm and its employees. Before production takes place,
firms and workers can engage in an arbitrary number of pairwise negotiations, where
wage contracts are unenforceable: the firm may fire any employee and any employee
may decide to quit. If the worker is forced to, or voluntarily enters into unemploy-
ment, where in the baseline model the value of being unemployed (w) is normalised
to zero. It is assumed that once negotiations begin the firm cannot hire additional
employees from the unemployment pool. All the firm’s other decisions – sampling,
screening, production, exporting – are sunk by the bargaining stage and can thus,
be regarded as state variables for the firm.
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) formally characterize the stable division of production
into wages and profits such that renegotiating improves neither the firm’s nor the
workers’ pay-offs. They show that the stable profile can be derived as the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium of an extensive form game where the firm and workers play
the alternating-offer bargaining game of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986)
within each bargaining session. The stable profile is characterized by the following




[r(Z, h)− w(Z, h)h] = (1− λ)w(Z, h)
where λ represents the bargaining power of the firm. This equation implies that the
surplus of a worker from employment (w(Z, his equal to the marginal surplus of the
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firm from employing the worker, weighted by their respective bargaining powers.17
Using the assumed functional forms for revenues this differential equation yields the
solution
w(θ) = λβγ1− λ+ λβγ
r(Z)
h(Z)
And with equal bargaining power between the firm and workers and assuming that
w = 0:
w(Z) = βγ1 + βγ
r(Z)
h(Z) (22)
Thus, as in ? the wage is equal to the the worker’s share of his contribution to the
value of the firm, taking into account that if the worker were to quit, this would also
influence the wages of other employees of the firm.
17Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show that because if a worker quits, renegotiations ensue with all
remaining workers, and this in turn allows a worker to obtain the same share of surplus associated
with workers prior to him in the order as those after him. Thus, this structure allows workers,
through their ability to renegotiate if breakdown occurs later, to effectively achieve the same out-
come as a wage agreement up front that is contingent on which workers are ultimately present.
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A.2 Firm’s optimisation problem
Given the profit function as in (10), a firm’s firs order condition for the number
of workers sampled for the home establishment (nH) and additionally if a firm is a
MNE for the foreign establishment (nF ) are: he firm’s first order conditions for the
measure of workers sampled for the home establishment (nH), the foreign affiliate













































)β  = c
d
aδc (25)
Combining equations (37) and (38), number of workers sampled in home plant rela-













In the model workers can be unemployed either because they are not matched with
a firm or because their match-specific ability draw is below the screening threshold
(ac) of the firm with which they are matched. Both components of unemployment
are frictional in the sense that workers cannot immediately achieve another match.
The sectoral unemployment rate u includes both of these components and can be
written as follows:






= 1− σx (27)
where, H is the measure of hired workers, n is the measure of matched workers,
and L is the measure of workers seeking employment in the sector. Then σ = h/n
captures the fraction of interviewed workers that are actually hired and x = n/l
denotes the number of interviews per job seeker.
In a next step, it is straight forward to derive the aggregate unemployment rate
U in the economy. It can be expressed as a weighted average of the rates of unem-
ployment in the homogeneous and differentiated sectors. With no unemployment in
the homogeneous sector, the aggregate rate of unemployment is therefore equal to








Derivation of output equation (10)
































Furthermore, plugging this expression into the previous one and using the expres-



















Expression for the Skill-Premium
Given equation (11), we next find the demand for low and high-skilled workers (see












































We can now use the expression for Lt and Ht to solve for the measures of input
varieties MHt and MLt
MLt =
[





βZLt (1− αL)(1−αL) ααLL












βZLt (1− αL)(1−αL) ααLL














βZHt (1− αH)(1−αH) ααHH














βZHt (1− αH)(1−αH) ααHH





Finally, plugging the expression for MHt and MLt back into equation (11), yields the
expression of the skill premium in equation (12).
C.2 Data
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Cote d‘Ivoire CI no
China CN no





United Kingdom GB yes
Guyana GY no





Republic of Korea KR no







El Salvador SV no
Thailand TH no
Turkey TR no
Trinidad & Tobago TT no
United States US yes
Venezuela VE no
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